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Lantagne: The Copymark Creep

THE COPYMARK CREEP: HOW THE
NORMATIVE STANDARDS OF FAN
COMMUNITIES CAN RESCUE COPYRIGHT
Stacey M. Lantagne
ABSTRACT
Copyrighted works are increasingly perceived by society as
serving a purpose traditionally considered to be held by trademarks.
Copyrighted works act as valuable brands within a consumer
marketplace, protected as corporate assets and defined to protect
commercial interests. This Article argues that the growing overlap
between copyright and trademark has resulted in a “copymark creep,”
evident in the judicial decisions that have confronted the issues.
This overlap has tipped the balance away from copyright’s
purported constitutional goal. Copyright is understood to benefit the
public by providing a public domain and protecting certain free
speech rights, whereas the trademarking of copyright chips away at
both of those benefits. The lack of bright line rules in the copyright
arena only adds to the uncertainty and leads to the stifling of more
speech, at further detriment to the public.
This Article proposes that the solution to this problem can be
found on the Internet through fan communities. Fan communities
employ bright line rules to create a system that is clearer than that
found in the judicial precedents, rather than the anything goes
anarchy they are frequently perceived as. These communities have
instinctively turned toward trademark protections in the copyright
context, relying on disclaimers to dispel confusion and on a lack of
commercialism to shelter them from infringement attacks. This
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importation of benchmarks more strongly associated with trademark
law both acknowledges the overall copymark creep and finds a way
to preserve copyright’s goals in the face of the creep, resulting in a
flourishing creative community. Finally, fan communities use these
benchmarks to set bright line rules for themselves that encourage
speech that might otherwise be hesitant in the face of legal
uncertainty.
If we are going to continually expand copyright law, we should at
least be careful to check it with those doctrines we use to keep
trademark from swallowing the cultural dialogue. Such an impulse is
the only one that makes sense to preserve the effectiveness of
copyright as a method of encouraging creativity. Otherwise, we run
the risk of using copyright as merely a backstop to trademark law and
lose sight of its different overall goal: to encourage creativity, not
commercial gain.
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INTRODUCTION
Copyright is a statutory scheme authorized by the Constitution to
promote progress by providing ownership in certain creative works.1
The brief, simple directive set forth by the Intellectual Property
Clause of the Constitution has led to a morass of overlapping statutes
that seek to strike a continually elusive balance between the rights of
the creator, to prevent others from using a creative work, and the
rights of the public, to engage with that creative work.2 At its heart,
copyright seeks to regulate the creative marketplace by giving some

1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2. See id.
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limited benefit to the few copyright holders to ultimately benefit of
the public at large.
Trademark law is a statutory scheme used to aid effective and
efficient consumer purchasing decisions. One of the many ornaments
dangling off the justifying branch of the Constitution’s Commerce
Clause, trademark law protects valuable symbols to clarify the
clamor of the competitive economy. At its heart, trademark seeks to
regulate the commercial marketplace by giving some limited benefit
to the few trademark holders to ultimately benefit the public at large.
In the abstract, having one system to deal with goods and services
and another system to deal with creative endeavors makes conceptual
sense. In practice, however, copyright and trademark have spilled
into each other to such an extent that attempts to disentangle the two
legal schemes have only led to muddled judicial decisions and
imprecision. The growing overlap between copyright and trademark
law leaves the public with little guidance as to how to enjoy the
benefits supposedly provided to them under both systems, tipping the
balance too much toward the rights holders.3
The Internet is frequently blamed for the confused state of the
copyright system. However, it is copyright holders who have caused
much of the blurring between copyright and trademark, by
increasingly treating their copyrighted works more like trademarks
and seeking an expansion of their copyright monopolies through
trademark law concepts.4 In the face of the resulting confusion this
“copymark” idea has left in the legal system, the folk wisdom of fan
communities on the Internet actually stands as a beacon of clarity.
Far from threatening the copyright system, the bright line rules that
fan communities have frequently adopted should be embraced for reestablishing the intended balance of copyright and trademark.

3. See infra Part I.
4. See infra Part I.D.
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I. THE INTERACTION OF COPYRIGHT AND TRADEMARK LAW
A. The Traditional Justifications for Two Separate Systems
In the beginning, there were two systems under two different
Constitutional clauses dealing with two different things in two
different ways: trademark and copyright.5 Historically, the difference
between these two seemed so clear-cut as to be obvious.
1. The Trademark Law Regime
Traditionally, trademark was a doctrine used to protect consumer
brands.6 Its Congressional authority is rooted in the Commerce
Clause.7 Trademark was meant to assist corporations in marketing
themselves and to aid consumers in making efficient buying
decisions.8 Trademark law is all about the marketplace and selling
goods in fair and profitable ways.9
The Lanham Act that governs trademark law “was intended . . . ’to
protect persons engaged in . . . commerce against unfair
competition.’”10 It was “not designed to protect originality or
creativity”11 and “should not be stretched to cover matters that are
typically of no consequence to purchasers.”12 Rather, its purpose is to
“reduce[] the customer’s costs of shopping and making purchasing
decisions” and ensure that the right company “will reap the financial,
reputation-related rewards associated with a desirable product.”13
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
6. See Viva R. Moffat, Mutant Copyrights and Backdoor Patents: The Problem of Overlapping
Intellectual Property Protection, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1473, 1488–89 (2004).
7. Id. at 1488.
8. Id. at 1488–89 (“[F]ederal trademark law seeks to protect consumers by allowing product- and
producer-differentiation that reduces the risk of consumer confusion and lowers search costs.”).
9. See id. at 1488–89, 1494–1500.
10. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 28 (2003) (quoting 15 U.S.C.
§ 1127 (1999)); see also Michael Todd Helfand, Note, When Mickey Mouse is as Strong as Superman:
The Convergence of Intellectual Property Laws to Protect Fictional Literary and Pictorial Characters,
44 STAN. L. REV. 623, 637 (1992) (“[T]rademarks benefit not only their owners, but consumers who
rely on identification of the sponsoring or producing business entity.”).
11. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 37.
12. Id. at 33; see also Meyer v. Rodex Sales & Servs., LLC, No. CV 05-176-S-MHW, 2006 WL
3355004, at *9 (D. Idaho Nov. 16, 2006).
13. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995).
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Therefore, trademark law is largely unconcerned with what happens
to the good once it is sold.14
2. The Copyright Law Regime
Copyright, on the other hand, was considered to be totally
different. After all, if it was not, there would have been no need for
the Lanham Act in the first place.15 Copyright law is a tense balance
between the rights of the creator and the rights of the public to
engage with creative works.16 As opposed to the commercial
emphasis of trademark law, copyright law is concerned with
creativity.17 Rooted in the Intellectual Property Clause of the
Constitution,18 copyright law was intended to encourage creative
works for the good of society at large, establishing an incentive
structure.19 This incentive structure would “motivate the creative
activity of authors and inventors”20 to ensure the “optimal level” of
14. See Bretford Mfg., Inc. v. Smith Sys. Mfg. Corp., 419 F.3d 576, 581 (7th Cir. 2005).
15. See Andrea Pacelli, Who Owns the Key to the Vault? Hold-up, Lock-out, and Other Copyright
Strategies, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1229, 1261–62 (2008).
16. Moffat, supra note 6, at 1476–77 (“Congress has passed numerous statutes creating
copyright . . . rights, in each case attempting to achieve a balance between the rights granted to the
creators and inventors and the benefits to the public, and in each case attempting to provide a sufficient
incentive for the production of new works.”); see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984); Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Copyright on Catfish Row: Musical
Borrowing, Porgy and Bess, and Unfair Use, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 277, 342 (2006); Joseph A. Lavigne, For
Limited Times? Making Rich Kids Richer Via the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1996, 73 U. DET.
MERCY L. REV. 311, 316 (1996); Joseph P. Liu, The New Public Domain, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1395,
1399–1400 (2013); Douglas Campbell Rennie, This Book is a Movie: The Faithful Adaptation as a
Benchmark for Analyzing the Substantial Similarity of Works in Different Media, 93 OR. L. REV. 49, 54
(2014); Edward C. Walterscheid, Defining the Patent and Copyright Term: Term Limits and the
Intellectual Property Clause, 7 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 315, 394 (2000); Jacqueline Lai Chung, Note,
Drawing Idea from Expression: Creating a Legal Space for Culturally Appropriated Literary
Characters, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 903, 938 (2007).
17. See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 37.
18. See Moffat, supra note 6, at 1488.
19. Nicholas B. Lewis, Comment, Shades of Grey: Can the Copyright Fair Use Defense Adapt to
New Re-contextualized Forms of Music and Art?, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 267, 280 (2005) (“[T]he goal of
copyright is public enrichment, based on providing incentives for artists to create new works . . . .”);
Arewa, supra note 16, at 343; Patrick R. Goold, Why the U.K. Adaptation Right is Superior to the U.S.
Derivative Work Right, 92 NEB. L. REV. 843, 888 (2014); Kathryn M. Foley, Note, Protecting Fictional
Characters: Defining the Elusive Trademark-Copyright Divide, 41 CONN. L. REV. 921, 924 (2009);
Allison Hollows, Comment, Who Owns the Athlete?: The Application of the Transformative Use Test in
the Right of Publicity Context, 45 SETON HALL L. REV. 285, 301 (2015); Moffat, supra note 6, at 1475,
1476–77.
20. Sony, 464 U.S. at 429.
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“production of valuable, remunerative, and socially beneficial new
works.”21 “What we want . . . is to assist authors in earning just
enough profit to, first, enhance the creative environment enough to
stimulate them to create works in the first place, and, second,
encourage them to make their works available to us.”22 This is why
copyright encourages the growth of a public domain of freely
available works.23 In fact, “[t]he ultimate purpose of . . . copyrights in
the United States is to enlarge the public domain of creative works by
authors and inventors, thereby promoting ‘the progress of science and
useful arts.’”24
The Copyright Act originally concerned books, maps, and charts25;
it later expanded to music, movies, and television shows.26 The Act,
however, never seemed to be primarily about selling goods so much
as that was just a side effect to the primary benefit of encouraging the
creation of such works.
3. The Differences in Practice
“Congress enacted the copyright and trademark statutes to protect
different types of intellectual property and redress different types of
harm.”27 The temptation to conflate the two may always have been
21. Moffat, supra note 6, at 1479; see also Goold, supra note 19, at 888 (“[W]ithout copyright
protection, it is arguable that the number of works created would decrease to a sub-optimal level.”);
Lavigne, supra note 16, at 316 (“Copyright is essentially a provision of monopolistic protection for
authors as an incentive for them to produce creative works for the public good.”); Edward C.
Walterscheid, The Remarkable—and Irrational—Disparity Between the Patent Term and the Copyright
Term, 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 233, 241 (2001).
22. Jessica Litman, Mickey Mouse Emeritus: Character Protection and the Public Domain, 11 U.
MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 429, 434 (1994).
23. Moffat, supra note 6, at 1481; see also Sony, 464 U.S. at 429; Foley, supra note 19, at 924.
24. Walterscheid, supra note 21, at 239; see also, e.g., Litman, supra note 22, at 433.
25. Christopher Buccafusco & Paul J. Heald, Do Bad Things Happen When Works Enter the Public
Domain?: Empirical Tests of Copyright Term Extension, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 6 (2013).
26. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
27. Zuffa, LLC v. Justin.tv, Inc., 838 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1104 (D. Nev. 2012); accord EMI Catalogue
P’ship v. Hill, Holliday, Connors, Cosmopulos Inc., 228 F.3d 56, 63–64 (2d Cir. 2000); Waldman
Publ’g Corp. v. Landoll, Inc., 43 F.3d 775, 781 (2d Cir. 1994); Bach v. Forever Living Prods. U.S., Inc.,
473 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1117 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (“Trademark and copyright law have fundamentally
different purposes.”); Lee B. Burgunder, The Scoop on Betty Boop: A Proposal to Limit Overreaching
Trademarks, 32 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 257, 269 (2012); Foley, supra note 19, at 953 (“[T]he nature of
the rights conferred by copyright and trademark are substantially different . . . .”); Liu, supra note 16, at
1428; Pacelli, supra note 15, at 1260; J.C. Sander, The End of Arbitrary Findings of Secondary
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there, as they both deal with word, sound, and image based methods
of creativity. Additionally, trademark law is expansive in its breadth,
allowing anything to be considered a trademark as long as it is
capable of carrying meaning28: an incredibly broad definition that
dovetails nicely with copyright’s protection of expression, and also
something that carries meaning.
However, the different justifications and resulting bodies of law
seemed initially to make it easy to distinguish between the two.29 For
one thing, while trademarks require commercial use to be protected,30
copyright operates to protect even private diary entries designed
never to be marketed at all.31 Indeed, copyright law sometimes
operates to protect the owner’s right to withdraw entirely from the
marketplace.32 Despite their surface similarity, copyright and
trademark have sometimes been in tension with each other.33
B. The Growing Overlap Between Copyright and Trademark
While initially the two realms of copyright and trademark seemed
clearly separate, the realm of copyright has begun to look much more
like the realm of trademark.
1. The Length of Protection
Where once copyright was limited in a manner similar to patent
laws, copyright terms have expanded outward so far that, to the

Meaning: A Call for the Expansion of Trademark Status of Literary Characters, 17 INTELL. PROP. L.
BULL. 1, 21 (2012) (“This coexistence of trademark and copyright laws should not be that big of a
problem, as they each deal with protecting different things.”).
28. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995).
29. Moffat, supra note 6, at 1475 (“Historically, patent, copyright, and trademark law protected very
different types of works; the three areas of law occupied three separate realms and there was little or no
overlap between them.”); see also Frederick Warne & Co. v. Book Sales, Inc., 481 F. Supp. 1191, 1196
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (“[T]he nature of the property right conferred by copyright is significantly different
from that of trademark . . . .”).
30. 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR COMPETITION § 16:1 (4th
ed. 1996).
31. See New Era Publ’ns Int’l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 593 (2d Cir. 1989).
32. See, e.g., Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 100 (2d Cir. 1987).
33. See, e.g., Sybersound Records, Inc. v. UAV Corp., 517 F.3d 1137, 1144 (9th Cir. 2008).
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average person, the term may as well be infinite.34 Copyright terms
are defined by life, which practically guarantees that no one, other
than the original creator, can culturally engage with the works being
produced during our lifetimes, and that are arguably most relevant to
us, because we will be dead by the time they enter the public
domain.35 This lengthy term looks far more like the indefinite term of
trademark than it does the extremely short term for patents.
2. Corporate Ownership
Most copyrights today are owned by corporations, not creators.36
Indeed, the prevalence of the work-for-hire doctrine,37 permitting
corporations to directly be considered “authors” for purposes of
copyright law,38 illustrates to what extent copyright is understood to
be a corporate asset. The concept of treating corporations as authors
for copyright purposes is foreign under the copyright structure of
most other countries.39 Corporate ownership of copyright, therefore,
is not intuitive to copyright. Rather, it appears to be a reaction to the
growing use of copyright in a trademark sense by corporations in the
marketplace.40

34. Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated Theory of Intellectual
Property, 88 VA. L. REV. 1455, 1499 (2002); Joshua Saval, Comment, Copyrights, Trademarks, and
Terminations: How Limiting Comic Book Characters in the Film Industry Reflects on Future
Intellectual Property Issues for Character Law, 9 FIU L. REV. 405, 431 (2014). Indeed, commentators
have noted that copyright has been expanded twice for the benefit of the same group of copyright
holders, giving the impression to them that the benefit could be infinitely expandable. See Lavigne,
supra note 16, at 350–51.
35. See Liu, supra note 16, at 1426 (“The extremely long term of copyright protection already means
that the concrete benefits of the public domain are relatively diffuse. Most individuals are vaguely aware
of a public domain, but think of these works in relatively remote terms (e.g., Shakespeare, classical
music, etc.).”).
36. See Scott M. Martin, The Mythology of the Public Domain: Exploring the Myths Behind Attacks
on the Duration of Copyright Protection, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 253, 280 (2002) (noting the debate over
how much the system “benefits corporations at the expense of authors”); Arewa, supra note 16, at 318.
37. See, e.g., RAYMOND T. NIMMER, LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY § 4:3, Westlaw (database
updated Sept. 2015); Judith A. Silver, Note, A Bad Dream: In Search of a Legal Framework for
Copyright Infringement Claims Involving Digital Imagery in Motion Pictures, 35 IDEA 407, 411–12
(1995).
38. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012).
39. See Martin, supra note 36, at 282–83.
40. See id. at 280.
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3. Copyright as Brands
A consequence of corporate ownership is that a copyright is
frequently a corporate asset used for selling in the marketplace, much
like a trademark.41 While the ability to license copyright no doubt
inspires some creativity, a copyright is more generally understood, by
public and copyright holders alike, as a branding tool.42 The
American Marketing Association explains that “[a] brand is a
‘[n]ame, term, design, symbol, or any other feature that identifies one
seller’s good or service as distinct from those of other sellers.’”43
While this sounds similar to the definition of a trademark,44 many
copyright holders use the term brand when referring to their
copyrighted properties.45
For example, a recent controversy erupted over a violent fan film
based on the Power Rangers characters.46 The maker of the film
argued that it was fair use, but the Power Rangers copyright holders
were concerned about the video, not because it was infringing
copyright necessarily, but because it might negatively impact their
“brand”: “[Y]ou can’t take a brand like this and reboot it so dark and
gritty. This is still a kids’ brand.”47 The Power Ranger copyright
holders were planning to produce a movie and were clearly
concerned that the arguably fair use video would harm them; not
because it was substantially similar to their very different
copyrighted products, but because it might tarnish what they were
doing48—a trademark law concept.49
In the same vein, many “news agencies use trademarks at the
beginning or end of an article to distinguish and reinforce their

41. See, e.g., Pacelli, supra note 15, at 1255–56.
42. See id. at 1249.
43. Dictionary, AM. MARKETING ASS’N., https://www.ama.org/resources/Pages/Dictionary.aspx
?dLetter=B (last visited Nov. 9, 2015).
44. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012).
45. See, e.g., B. Alan Orange, ‘Power Rangers’ Fan Film Returns After Copyright Dispute,
MOVIEWEB (Feb. 28, 2015), http://www.movieweb.com/power-rangers-movie-fan-film-banned-online.
46. See id.
47. Id. (quoting Jason David Frank, a former Power Ranger).
48. See id.
49. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012).
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brand.”50 The “brand,” of course, that they are seeking to protect here
is in fact their news articles—traditionally the subject of copyright.51
But their desire to use the commercial doctrines of trademark law to
attempt to protect their copyright is understandable: “Journalistic
content might not be a ‘good’ or product in the traditional sense, but
it is most certainly a commercialized product. Garnering goodwill
with the public thus is of supreme importance.”52
Explicitly reflecting the brand understanding of copyrighted
works, copyright holders have frequently begun to trademark titles of
movies, titles of books, works of art, and even the names of
characters.53 In this way, copyright law has come to seem more
consumer goodwill driven (like trademark) than expression driven
(like traditionally copyright).54 Copyright holders propose the same
idea in multiple iterations, “rebooting” franchises frequently, in a
way that relies heavily on consumer recognition of the brand in
question.55
4. The Lack of Unified Treatment within Copyright Statutes
The jumbled state of the copyright statutory scheme, with its
inconsistent view on what is and is not a copyright, has added to the
confusion. The legal definition of “copyright” has been challenged by
increasingly regulatory statutes, like the Digital Millennium
50. Matthew Novaria, Note, Piracy of Online News: A “Moral Rights” Approach to Protecting a
Journalist’s Right of Attribution and Right of Integrity, 24 DEPAUL J. ART TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L.
295, 313 (2014).
51. See, e.g., Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d 537, 541–42
(S.D.N.Y. 2013).
52. Novaria, supra note 50, at 313.
53. See Eriq Gardner, ‘Twilight’ Producer Facing Possible Trial this Month for Interfering on
Parody, HOLLYWOOD REP. (NOV. 13, 2014, 3:08 PM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thresq/twilight-producer-facing-trial-month-748852. Indeed, some people have started trademarking
statements they have used to answer questions, signalling just how valuable merchandising has become.
See Darren Rovell, Lynch Seeks “I’m Just Here” Trademark, ESPN.COM (Feb. 23, 2015),
http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/12371993/marshawn-lynch-seattle-seahawks-files-trademark-superbowl-media-day-quote.
54. See Gardner, supra note 53; Rovell, supra note 53.
55. See Foley, supra note 19, at 937; Goold, supra note 19, at 883–84; Courtney Enlow, Eff It, Let’s
Just Reboot Everything: 10 More Shows We Should Drag Out of the Grave, PAJIBA (Apr. 8, 2015),
http://www.pajiba.com/miscellaneous/eff-it-just-reboot-everything-10-more-shows-we-should-drag-outof-the-grave.php.
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Copyright Act (the “DMCA”)56 that define what can and cannot be
copyrighted based on narrow, specific situations, at times apparently
using the newness of developing technologies to overturn accepted
jurisprudence on what is protectable and what is permissible.57 As
such, although copyright’s delineated bundle of rights does not
include a “right of attribution,”58 commentators have suggested that
the DMCA confers a “de facto” one.59 Other commentators have
noted that the DMCA can operate to limit use of works in the public
domain, which would have been free to use under traditional
copyright law.60 Other proposed statutes, like the You Own Devices
Act,61 have been regarded as trying to prevent “copyright mind
tricks” from being employed.62
C. The Creation of the Concept of “Copymark”
Given the ways in which copyright has come to seem more like it
is protecting something similar to trademark, copyright holders have
tried to use trademark law to add protection to their copyrighted
works.63 Copyright holders are understandably attempting to broaden
their copyright monopoly, so they treat trademark law as an
56. See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–22 (2012). Indeed, although the statute has “copyright” in its
title, commentators have noted that it has been used “as a competitive weapon for purposes that had
essentially nothing to do with [copyright objectives], but more to do with the prevention of
competition.” Arewa, supra note 16, at 292.
57. See Edward Lee, Warming up to User-Generated Content, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1459, 1466
(2008).
58. Michael Landau & Donna K. Lewis, Issues and Best Practices in Connection with Educational
Resources and Other Materials in the “Cloud”, 24 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 627,
664–65 (2014).
59. Novaria, supra note 50, at 314–15.
60. See Liu, supra note 16, at 1454.
61. H.R. 862, 114th Cong. (2015).
62. Jeff Roberts, “YODA law” would ensure devices can be resold free of copyright, GIGAOM (Feb.
11, 2015, 10:42 AM PST), https://gigaom.com/2015/02/11/yoda-law-would-ensure-devices-can-beresold-free-of-copyright/.
63. See, e.g., EMI Catalogue P’ship v. Hill, Holliday, Connors, Cosmopulos Inc., 228 F.3d 56, 63
(2d Cir. 2000); Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. New Line Cinema, 200 F.3d 593, 595 (9th Cir. 2000); Nat’l
Comics Publ’ns, Inc. v. Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc., 191 F.2d 594, 603 (2d Cir. 1951); Galerie Furstenberg v.
Coffaro, 697 F. Supp. 1282, 1290 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Helfand, supra note 10, at 623, 641; Alex Kozinski,
Mickey & Me, 11 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 465, 467–68 (1994); Zahr K. Said, Fixing
Copyright in Characters: Literary Perspectives on a Legal Problem, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 769, 773
(2013).
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expansive doctrine that might compensate them for damage that
might not otherwise be recognized by copyright law.64 In this way,
copyright holders have come to encourage a way of thinking about
copyright that is a blend between copyright and trademark: a
“copymark” idea.
1. The Copymark Creep
Copyright holders have attempted to expand their copyright
monopoly by borrowing from trademark law concepts. 65 Where
copyright law leaves gaps that cause copyright holders to feel
exposed, they turn to trademark law for extra protection.66 In this
way, trademark law has been used in the name of expanding the
copyright monopoly.67 This is especially alluring in cases where a
copyright has expired,68 but is by no means limited to such
situations.69 Similarly, in application to situations it was not
originally intended for, the scope of trademark protection itself has
greatly expanded beyond its original intentions.70
64. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Kamar Indus., Inc., No. H-82-2377, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15942, at *10 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 20, 1982) (finding two lines of dialogue copyrighted based not on
copyright standards like originality and creativity but rather on consumer understanding that the lines
were “readily recognizable to the lay observer as key lines of dialogue”); Gershwin v. Whole Thing Co.,
No. CV 80-569, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16465, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 1980) (discussing the
trademark harm of goodwill in the context of copyright infringement); Michael Abramowicz, A Theory
of Copyright’s Derivative Right and Related Doctrines, 90 MINN. L. REV. 317, 334 (2005) (raising the
possibility “that judges protect characters and plots based on some intuitive sense that reusing them
amounts to misappropriation” rather than relying on strictures of copyright law in their decisions);
Sander, supra note 27, at 2.
65. Sander, supra note 27, at 1–2.
66. See, e.g., Saval, supra note 34, at 422–23.
67. See Moffat, supra note 6, at 1496 (“[T]rademark law now protects a wide variety of ‘product
identifiers’ in circumstances hardly imaginable a hundred years ago.”); Helfand, supra note 10, at 652
(“Unchecked, it expands the scope of exclusive rights of copyright . . . .”). In some circumstances, the
copyright holder only has a trademark argument to make based on the copyright protection it received,
meaning that “the monopoly granted during the copyright term served only to facilitate the copyright
owner’s development of . . . trademark protection, and the public receives nothing in exchange for the
grant of a copyright monopoly.” Foley, supra note 19, at 957; Frederick Warne & Co. v. Book Sales
Inc., 481 F. Supp. 1191, 1196 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Pacelli, supra note 15, at 1259, 1263–64.
68. See Comedy III, 200 F.3d at 595.
69. See EMI Catalogue P’ship v. Hill, Holliday, Connors, Cosmopulos Inc., 228 F.3d 56, 63 (2d Cir.
2000); Nat’l Comics Publ’ns, Inc. v. Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc., 191 F.2d 594, 603 (2d Cir. 1951); Galerie
Furstenberg v. Coffaro, 697 F. Supp. 1282, 1290 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
70. See Moffat, supra note 6, at 1494; Litman, supra note 22, at 430; Liu, supra note 16, at 1428.
Indeed, the attempt to “hybridize” intellectual property regimes goes both ways, as trademark holders
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Influenced by the ways in which copyright and trademark were
beginning to blur, courts began discussing them in overlapping
terms.71 For instance, in a Ninth Circuit case involving Mickey
Mouse, the court used a traditional trademark test in deciding the
copyright cause of action.72 The Second Circuit has similarly
conflated copyright and trademark, discussing trademark likelihood
of confusion in the context of its copyright substantial similarity
analysis.73 Some of the leading cases have therefore blurred the
copyright and trademark lines.74
The interplay of characters acting as both trademarks and as
copyrighted entities is one of the areas where copymark creep is most
visible. In an early case involving copyrighted comic strips, a court
refused to view the comic strips as functioning like trademarks: “In
the case of these silly pictures nobody cares who is the producer—
least of all, children who are the chief readers—; the ‘strips’ sell
because they amuse and please, and they amuse and please because
they are what they are, not because they come from ‘Detective.’”75
These copyrighted comic strips, the court found, were successful
because of their creativity, not because they indicated a single source
in the way that a trademark might.76
Copyright holders continued to raise the issue, however, probably
because they were treating their copyrighted materials as
trademarks.77 So, Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) asserted
both copyright and trademark protection in not only the characters,
but also in a variety of other features of the Amos ‘n’ Andy radio
shows, including some dialogue.78 The court made no ruling on
will also seek to backstop their trademark protection with copyright protection. See, e.g., Murray Hill
Publ’ns, Inc. v. ABC Commc’ns, Inc., 264 F.3d 622, 632–33 (6th Cir. 2001).
71. Said, supra note 63, at 773 (“[B]ecause courts have not historically paid enough attention to the
differences between [copyright and trademark law], the case law has evolved in a doctrinally haphazard
fashion.”); Foley, supra note 19, at 945 (referring to a “less coherent line of cases that often commingled
trademark and copyright principles”).
72. See Helfand, supra note 10, at 646.
73. See id. at 650.
74. See sources cited supra note 64.
75. Nat’l Comics Publ’ns, Inc. v. Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc., 191 F.2d 594, 603 (2d Cir. 1951).
76. Id.
77. Silverman v. CBS Inc., 870 F.2d 40, 45 (2d Cir. 1989).
78. Id.
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whether or not CBS owned valid marks, however, because it found
that, even if it had, it had abandoned them.79 The court acknowledged
being influenced in its trademark ruling by the fact that the case also
had copyright implications, noting that “[i]n the area of artistic
speech, . . . enforcement of trademark rights carries a risk of
inhibiting free expression.”80 Other courts, however, became more
comfortable with the conflation of copyright and trademark law.81
This is clearly seen in the case of Mickey Mouse,82 possibly the
most famous copyrighted work to have also gained trademark
protection. Cases dealing with Mickey Mouse jumble trademark,
trade dress, and copyright language all together, with little regard to
the differences between them.83 A court referred to a defendant as
“exploit[ing],
without
authorization,
established
trademarks . . . without any copyright license and mimick[ing]
plaintiff’s well-established trade dress.”84 Throughout the opinion the
court continued to switch between intellectual property regimes,
referring to “trademark rights,” “copyright designation[s],”
“licensee[s],” and even just “Disney’s rights,” with little attempt
made to differentiate which intellectual property right was actually
being violated by any given conduct.85 In fact, in one impressive
paragraph, the court strung together three consecutive sentences
referring to three different types of intellectual property as if they
were one and the same:
Disney’s copyrights in Mickey Mouse and Minnie Mouse
will be enforced as to exact copies and variations of

79. Id.
80. Id. at 48 (citing L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 28–29 (1st Cir. 1987).
81. See, e.g., DC Comics Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Bus., 598 F. Supp. 110 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
Compare Warner Bros. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 530 F. Supp. 1187, 1193 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (finding that the
Superman character deserved copyright protection based on “forty years of development in various
media,” which sounds more like a testament to trademark use and public recognition), with Detective
Comics, Inc. v. Bruns Publ’ns, Inc., 111 F.2d 432, 434 (2d Cir. 1940) (finding that the plaintiff was “not
entitled to a monopoly of the mere character of a ‘Superman’ who is a blessing to mankind”).
82. Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 698 F. Supp. 10 (D.D.C. 1988).
83. Id. at 11–12.
84. Id. at 11.
85. Id. at 12.
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Mickey and Minnie. These variations are classic examples
of trade dress violations, for Mickey and Minnie have
acquired not only a secondary meaning, but a meaning of
great value, favorable in all respects, and well-entrenched
worldwide. Powell’s free ride on the ingenuity, skillful
promotion, and resulting public acceptance which Disney
has rightfully gained from these charming mouse characters
must come to an end.86
Plaintiffs sometimes bring both trademark and copyright causes of
action, which causes the mingling of judicial reasoning.87 In other
cases, however, the plaintiffs have imported trademark law principles
into copyright law arguments, without bringing a trademark cause of
action.88 Some courts have been willing to nebulously expand
copyright past anything the author has created, referring vaguely to
“lives in the public imagination that extend far beyond the reach of
the individual works.”89 One court explicitly gave up trying to
determine “the precise application of the copyright . . . to each of
[the] examples.”90 Other courts are drawn to the idea of simply
calling everything “intellectual property rights”91 or even
“proprietary interests”92 without sorting through the different
analyses. This confusion has happened because these decisions, while
ostensibly concerning copyright, are really about protecting some
undefined combination of copyright and trademark that could be
called “copymark.” Some courts also explicitly conflated substantial
similarity, a copyright doctrine, with likelihood of confusion, a

86. Id.
87. See, e.g., Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 31–32 (2003).
88. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Megaupload Ltd., No. 11cv0191-IEG (BLM), 2011 WL 3203117, at
*7 (S.D. Cal. July 27, 2011) (noting that the defendant characterized the plaintiff’s claims as “copyright
claims disguised as trademark claims”). Parties have, of course, acknowledged this tactic in arguments
in front of courts. Id.
89. DC Comics Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Bus., 598 F. Supp. 110, 118 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
90. Walt Disney, 698 F. Supp. at 13.
91. Lyons P’ship v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 794 (4th Cir. 2001).
92. Id. at 795.
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trademark doctrine, and provided little explanation as to why those
two separate doctrines suddenly mean the same thing.93
This copymark creep extends to the ways in which courts treat
copyright defenses. Courts have also been willing to use harm “akin
to that of dilution in trademark law” to find against copyright fair use
analyses.94 Other courts have gone “through the motions of
evaluating the statutory fair use factors, yet focused almost entirely
on the economic value and goodwill . . . , erroneously importing
trademark principles into the copyright fair use analysis.”95
2. Dastar
The Supreme Court’s leading case on the “copymark creep” issue,
Dastar Corporation v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,
acknowledged the collision of trademark and copyright law
concepts.96 However, the Dastar holding left many questions in its
wake which has only increased the muddle of how copyright holders
view trademark law as a weapon in their arsenal.
Dastar involved the television series Crusade in Europe, which
was first broadcast in 1949 and which Fox owned the copyright to.97
Due to Fox’s failure to comply with the formality requirements
written into the copyright statute at the time, the copyright in
Crusade in Europe lapsed, which left the series in the public
domain.98 Dastar purchased a copy of the public domain television
series, edited it, and began selling it as part of a series called World
War II Campaigns in Europe.99
Fox was less than pleased with this development, but Fox had a
problem: it no longer owned the copyright in Crusades in Europe.
Therefore, Fox could not allege that Dastar’s use of the television

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
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series was infringing in any way.100 Fox then turned to trademark
law.101
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, which governs trademark law,
contains a cause of action for “reverse passing off.”102 Reverse
passing off is a cause of action “against a person who use[s] in
commerce[,] either ‘a false designation of origin, or any false
description or representation’ in connection with ‘any goods or
services.’”103 Passing off is placing another’s trademark onto your
own goods, whereas reverse passing off is placing your trademark
onto another’s goods.104 The disagreement in Dastar was not over
mislabeling the goods; it was, in copyright terms, over a failure to
attribute.105
The standard for recovery on a reverse passing off claim is the
trademark linchpin: whether the public is confused.106 In essence,
Fox’s claim was that Dastar’s use of Fox’s formerly copyrighted
television series confused people as to who had created the series.107
As a Lanham Act claim, this is unmistakably a trademark cause of
action.108 However, under copyright law, Fox’s television series was
no longer protected at all.109
The district court was convinced by Fox’s reverse passing off
argument and awarded Dastar’s profits to Fox.110 The court even
doubled the award to make sure that Dastar was not tempted to
“infring[e]” again in the future.111 The problem, of course, was that
100. Id. at 26.
101. Id. at 27.
102. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2012).
103. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 29 (quoting Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427, 441 (1946)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1))).
104. MCCARTHY, supra note 30, § 25:4.
105. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 37.
106. MCCARTHY supra note 30, § 25:6.
107. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 31 (“[T]he gravamen of respondents’ claim is that, in marketing and selling
Campaigns as its own product without acknowledging its nearly wholesale reliance on the Crusade
television series, Dastar has made a ‘false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact,
or false or misleading representation of fact, which . . . is likely to cause confusion . . . as to the
origin . . . of his or her goods.’”).
108. Id. at 32.
109. Id. at 31.
110. Id. at 28.
111. Id.
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Dastar had not infringed anything at all. Crusade in Europe was in
the public domain. By definition, formerly copyrighted works
currently in the public domain cannot be infringed.112 Fox had to turn
to trademark law because copyright law was of no assistance. If Fox
wanted to expand its copyright monopoly, it had to do it by importing
trademark law concepts.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court, finding that Dastar had performed a “bodily appropriation” of
the television series that constituted reverse passing off and justified
awarding damages to Fox.113
The Supreme Court, however, disagreed, starting its analysis with
the fact that Dastar “took a creative work in the public domain.”114
But the Supreme Court then veered away from its discussion of the
public domain nature of the copyrighted work and whether it could
be lassoed into trademark law, choosing instead to focus on the
definition of the word “origin” in the reverse passing off statute.115 If
Fox could be considered the origin of Dastar’s product, even though
Dastar had been working with a public domain work, the Court
thought it could still be liable for reverse passing off.116
Ultimately, the Court decided against Fox on the reverse passing
off issue.117 The Court did not explicitly cordon off copyright from
trademark, but rather relied on a precise definition of the word
“goods.”118 The good at issue in Dastar was not any copyrighted
work, whether that work might be Crusade in Europe or World War
II Campaigns in Europe.119 Rather, the good at issue was the physical
videotape that World War II Campaigns in Europe was contained
on.120 The videotape at issue originated from Dastar; there was no
confusion about that, and Fox did not dispute that it had not created

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
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the physical videotape.121 For the Court, that was where the Lanham
Act’s governance ended.122
3. “Copymark Creep” post-Dastar
a. Dastar’s Shortcomings
Dastar is a curious decision,123 especially notable for its very
narrow reading of a statute that had formerly been called “a remedial
provision [that] should be broadly construed.”124 For one, it seems to
draw a distinction between copyright law and trademark law125 that is
not quite correct. In the Court’s view, copyright law appears to exist
to protect nebulous, intangible things.126 But copyright law does not
protect anything until it is “fixed in [a] tangible medium of
expression.”127 The concept of something that is protected by
copyright that is separable from its embodiment in a physical good is
confusing. Even more problematic, though, copyright emphatically
does not protect “ideas.”128 The Dastar Court noted that an attempt to
121. Id. at 38.
122. Id.
123. See, e.g., Richard H. Chused, The Legal Culture of Appropriation Art: The Future of Copyright
in the Remix Age, 17 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 163, 209 n.150 (2014) (“The result in Dastar seems
wrong to me . . . .”); Liu, supra note 16, at 1431 (“The Court’s opinion is interesting and somewhat odd
in a number of ways.”).
124. Geisel v. Poynter Prods. Inc., 283 F. Supp. 261, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
125. See Liu, supra note 16, at 1431–32.
126. See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 33.
127. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
128. See Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1356 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Copyright law protects an author’s
expression; facts and ideas within a work are not protected.”); Nat’l Comics Publ’ns, Inc. v. Fawcett
Publ’ns, Inc., 191 F.2d 594, 600 (2d Cir. 1951) (“[A] copyright never extends to the ‘idea’ of the
‘work’ . . . .”); Jeffrey Milstein, Inc. v. Greger, Lawlor, Roth, Inc., 58 F.3d 27, 32 (2d Cir. 1995); Conan
Props., Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 353, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (“One of the first rudiments of
intellectual property is that no one may copyright an idea.”); Warner Bros. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 530 F.
Supp. 1187, 1190 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Burgunder, supra note 27, at 272 (“[C]opyrights cover expressions,
but not ideas . . . .”); Cameron Hutchison, Insights from Psychology for Copyright’s Originality
Doctrine, 52 IDEA 101, 109 (2012) (“Copyright subsists in the expression of a work and not the ideas
or facts which underlie it.”); Martin, supra note 36, at 268, 270 (“[C]opyright . . . accords no protection
for ideas. . . . [I]t provides absolutely no protection for ideas.”); John M. Olin,”Recoding” and the
Derivative Works Entitlement: Addressing the First Amendment Challenge, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1488,
1491 (2006); Rennie, supra note 16, at 54 (“[C]opyright protection does not protect ideas.”); Saval,
supra note 34, at 410 (“[C]opyright protection does not extend to an idea.”); Said, supra note 63, at 782.
But see DC Comics, Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Bus., 598 F. Supp. 110, 118 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (praising a
“creative effort” that “fashion[ed] . . . ideas”); King Features Syndicate v. Fleischer, 299 F. 533, 535 (2d
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protect the “originat[or of] ideas”129 is not permitted under the
Lanham Act, but this leaves open the implication that it might be
protected under the Copyright Act, which is simply not true.130 Other
courts have noted this implication and carried forth the confusion. 131
Additionally, stating that the Lanham Act is referring to the
physical goods is imprecise because not all marks protected by the
Lanham Act refer to physical goods.132 Many of the commercial uses
that the Lanham Act is seeking to protect from confusion never
involve physical goods in any way, shape, or form.133
Dastar increased the muddled relationship between trademark law
and copyright law. Dastar did not say that a work in the public
domain cannot gain extra protection through trademark law.134
Nevertheless, some courts and parties read Dastar in exactly that
way.135 This impulse is understandable; courts prior to Dastar
Cir. 1924) (discussing the infringement of a “copyrighted idea”); Steven D. Jamar, Crafting Copyright
Law to Encourage and Protect User-Generated Content in the Internet Social Networking Context, 19
WIDENER L.J. 843 (2010).
129. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 32.
130. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
131. See, e.g., Radolf v. Univ. of Conn., 364 F. Supp. 2d 204, 222 (D. Conn. 2005) (“[C]opyright and
patent laws sufficiently cover inventions, discoveries, ideas and concepts . . . . Because Dr. Radolf’s
claim centers around his contention that he was the ‘author’ or originator of the ideas and concepts that
underlie the DOD Grant, his Lanham Act claim necessarily fails in light of Dastar.” (internal citations
omitted)); Monilisa Collection, Inc. v. Clarke Prods., Inc., No. 6:11-CV-360-ORL-31GJK, 2011 WL
2893630, at *2 (M.D. Fla. July 20, 2011) (“[T]he ‘origin of goods’ language in the Act refers to the
production of the tangible goods offered for sale, and not to the authorship of any idea, concept, or
communication embodied in those goods.”); McArdle v. Mattel Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 769, 783 (E.D.
Tex. 2006); Tao of Sys. Integration, Inc. v. Analytical Servs. & Materials, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 2d 565,
572 (E.D. Va. 2004).
132. See, e.g., Pro Search Plus, LLC v. VFM Leonardo, Inc., No. SACV 12-2102-JST (ANx), 2013
WL 3936394, at *7 (C.D. Cal. July 30, 2013); Bob Creeden & Assocs., Ltd. v. Infosoft, Inc., 326 F.
Supp. 2d 876, 879 (N.D. Ill. 2004); Smith v. New Line Cinema, No. 03 Civ. 5274 (DC), 2004 WL
2049232, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2004); Do it Best Corp. v. Passport Software, Inc., No. 01 C 7674,
2004 WL 1660814, at *17 (N.D. Ill. July 23, 2004).
133. See, e.g., Do it Best Corp., 2004 WL 1660814, at *4.
134. Mary LaFrance, A Material World: Using Trademark Law to Override Copyright’s First Sale
Rule for Imported Copies, 21 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 43, 71 (2014); Landau & Lewis,
supra note 58, at 664.
135. See, e.g., Defined Space, Inc. v. Lakeshore E., LLC, 797 F. Supp. 2d 896, 901 (N.D. Ill. 2011)
(“This case does not involve works in the public domain, . . . such as the Supreme Court faced in
Dastar.”); Williams v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1184–85 (C.D. Cal. 2003); Pers.
Keepsakes, Inc. v. Personalizationmall.com, Inc., No. 11 C 5177, 2012 WL 414803, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Feb.
8, 2012); Novaria, supra 50, at 313–14 (“[W]hen interpreted broadly, Dastar probably affects all
uncopyrighted works and content—not merely expired copyrights.”).
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focused on copyrighted status when debating the interaction between
trademark and copyright law.136 However, it is not what Dastar held,
resisting such a bright line rule. Nor did the Dastar court limit the
Lanham Act to cases involving trademarks, which would also
provide a bright line rule.137 Rather, Dastar held that the Lanham Act
does not protect against confusion as to the origin of “ideas”138—
which is protected by neither trademark nor copyright.139
Dastar noted that expanding reverse passing off to include the
originator of “intellectual content” would cause trademark law to
conflate with copyright law.140 The Court noted that it has “been
‘careful to caution against misuse or over-extension’ of trademark
and related protections into areas traditionally occupied by patent or
copyright.”141 Additionally, it acknowledged that allowing a reverse
passing off claim for the copyrighted work at issue “would create a
species of mutant copyright law.”142 At the same time, the holding
has left itself vulnerable to continued confusion as to exactly where
the line between copyright and trademark is drawn to prevent this
“mutant copyright law.”143
For instance, the Court did not discuss whether the rationale that
prohibits the reverse passing off claims from applying in Dastar
would also extend to passing off claims.144 As the similar names
imply, passing off and reverse passing off belong to the same general
family of claims.145 As discussed, passing off is selling goods with
136. See, e.g., Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. New Line Cinema, 200 F.3d 593, 595 (9th Cir. 2000);
Lacour v. Time Warner Inc., No. 99 C 7105, 2000 WL 688946, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 24, 2000).
137. See Romero v. Buhimschi, 396 F. App’x. 224, 231 (6th Cir. 2010); Schlotzsky’s, Ltd. v. Sterling
Purchasing & Nat’l Distrib. Co., 520 F.3d 393, 399 (5th Cir. 2008); Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v.
Culbro Corp., 399 F.3d 462, 478 (2d Cir. 2005); Zyla v. Wadsworth, 360 F.3d 243, 251 (1st Cir. 2004).
But see Bretford Mfg., Inc. v. Smith Sys. Mfg. Corp., 419 F.3d 576, 580 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding that
Dastar requires a trademark harm given the Court’s focus on the goods’ origins).
138. See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 37 (2003) (concluding that
the reverse passing off cause of action did not apply “to the author of any idea, concept, or
communication embodied in those goods”) (citing 17 U.S.C.§ 202).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 33.
141. Id. at 34 (quoting TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001)).
142. Id.
143. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 34.
144. See id.
145. See 1-1 MELVILLE NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHTS § 1.01(B)(1)(e),
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another’s trademark on them; reverse passing off is selling someone
else’s goods with your trademark on them.146 Commentators have
disagreed about whether Dastar also affects passing off claims
because of this interrelationship and Dastar’s silence on passing
off.147
In many well-known passing off cases decided prior to Dastar,
courts have endorsed the idea of confusion of authorship of a creative
good sounding claim in trademark law.148 For example, in addition to
copyright infringement, in Gilliam v. American Broadcasting
Companies, Monty Python was entitled to bring a claim under the
Lanham Act based on American Broadcasting Company (ABC)
“passing off” work as Monty Python’s own work.149 Courts rely on
Gilliam in the continued survival of the false designation of
“sponsorship” claims if a work has been altered,150 but it is difficult
to see how the rationale behind Gilliam differs from the rationale
behind the reverse passing off claim in Dastar: confusion about who
made a creative good. Commentators have noted that reading Dastar
as overturning Gilliam would provoke an “earthquake” in the law,151
but the Dastar reasoning could be interpreted to provoke just that sort
of earthquake.152

LEXIS (2015).
146. Id.
147. Id. § 1.01(D)(2); see also Aagard v. Palomar Builders, Inc., 344 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1216 (E.D.
Cal. 2004).
148. See Frederick Warne & Co. v. Book Sales Inc., 481 F. Supp. 1191, 1197 (S.D.N.Y. 1979);
LaFrance, supra note 134, at 72.
149. Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 24–25 (2d Cir. 1976); see also Jaeger v. Am. Int’l
Pictures, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 274, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
150. Museum Boutique Intercont’l, Ltd. v. Picasso, 880 F. Supp. 153, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
151. See David Nimmer, The Moral Imperative Against Academic Plagiarism (Without a Moral Right
Against Reverse Passing Off), 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 43 (2004).
152. See Rebecca Tushnet, Dastar and design patent, REBECCA TUSHNET’S 43(B)LOG (Sept. 12, 2014,
11:43 AM), http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2014/09/dastar-and-design-patent.html; see also Register of
Copyrights: Hearing on H.R. 4586 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet & Intell. Prop. of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Marybeth Peters) (“[T]he
longstanding understanding prior to Dastar [was] that section 43(a) is an important means for protecting
the moral rights of attribution and integrity.”).
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i. The Problem with the Focus on the Physical Goods
The Dastar court noted in dicta that reverse passing off would
have succeeded as a claim if Dastar had bought some of the
videotapes “and merely repackaged them as its own.”153 The Dastar
court was referring to the purchase of the physical videotapes
themselves because the Court went on to state that what really
happened here was a copying of the copyrighted work on that
physical videotape, followed by “arguably minor” modifications.154
This apparently placed the focus on the physical good that was the
videotape, not the show contained upon it.
However, some courts interpreted Dastar’s language as a reference
to a copyright infringement idea of failing to transform. 155 The
district court in Defined Space v. Lakeshore East, for instance,
declined to dismiss a Lanham Act claim because the defendant fit
into Dastar’s dicta exception when it “took the plaintiff’s photos and
repackaged them as their own without revision.”156 The district court
agreed that Dastar’s dicta was “directly on point.”157 Dastar’s dicta
exception was not about the amount of revision; however, it was
about the physical good itself.158
The modern world’s goods are increasingly not tangible, which
makes the Dastar decision difficult for courts to apply. The
separation of physical tangible goods and the intellectual property
wrapped up in those goods is not as straightforward as the Dastar
decision implied.159 For instance, the Central District of California
was faced with the question of whether the plaintiff would be
153. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 31 (2003).
154. Id.; see also Aagard v. Palomar Builders, Inc., 344 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1218 (E.D. Cal. 2004)
(acknowledging that the Lanham Act still applies to “tangible products”).
155. Defined Space, Inc. v. Lakeshore E., LLC, 797 F. Supp. 2d 896, 900 (N.D. Ill. 2011).
156. Id. (quoting Cable v. Agence France Presse, 728 F. Supp. 2d 977, 981 (N.D. Ill. 2010)).
157. Id. at 901.
158. See San Jose Options, Inc. v. Ho Chung Yeh, No. CV 14-00500-KAW, 2014 WL 1868738, at *5
(N.D. Cal. May 7, 2014); Deckers Outdoor Corp. v. J.C. Penney Co., 45 F. Supp. 3d 1181, 1185 (C.D.
Cal. 2014). The Defined Space court itself notes that other courts have disagreed with its reading of
Dastar. See Defined Space, 797 F. Supp. 2d at 901 n.2 (citing Agence France Presse v. Morel, 769 F.
Supp. 2d 295, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)).
159. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Syngenta Seeds, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 2d 648, 652 (D. Del. 2006)
(debating whether the product at issue was a physical seed or the genetic traits of that physical seed).
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considered the “author” of digital images, foreclosing a Lanham Act
claim, or the “printer / publisher” and thus the originator of the
images, permitting a Lanham Act claim.160 The Southern District of
New York found a “motion picture” to be a physical good, while the
screenplay the motion picture was based on was not a physical
good.161
Computer software is the most visible category of this problem
because computer software is almost never physical. Therefore, when
courts try to decide whether Dastar forecloses a Lanham Act claim
with regard to computer software, they seem to focus, like the
Defined Space court, on the degree to which the program was
changed. A Lanham Act claim was allowed where the competitor did
little more than change the coding for the opening “splash screens” of
the program.162 However, where the computer program was further
altered so that the Lanham Act allegations involved where the
program had been “derived” from, the court dismissed the Lanham
Act claims as foreclosed by Dastar.163
The instinct to examine the extent of the “plagiarism” is
understandable because courts are naturally more comfortable with
condemning more verbatim copying.164 However, it is attempting to
create an artificial distinction. The dichotomy between physical
goods and the intellectual basis of the goods does not work for a
product, like computer software, that is never a physical good. Courts
instead equate an unchanged computer program with a physical
good.165 If that is the case, however, then why is an unchanged poem
not considered physical good, too?166 Even more damning, the

160. Pro Search Plus, LLC v. VFM Leonardo, Inc., No. SACV 12-2102-JST (ANx), 2013 WL
3936394, at *7 (C.D. Cal. July 30, 2013).
161. Smith v. New Line Cinema, No. 03 CIV. 5274 (DC), 2004 WL 2049232, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
13, 2004).
162. Do It Best Corp. v. Passport Software, Inc., No. 01 C 7674, 2004 WL 1660814, at *17 (N.D. Ill.
July 23, 2004).
163. Bob Creeden & Assocs., Ltd. v. Infosoft, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 2d 876, 879 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
164. Courts have used the word “plagiarist” interchangeably with “infringer.” See, e.g., Nat’l Comics
Publ’ns, Inc. v. Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc., 191 F.2d 594, 603 (2d Cir. 1951).
165. See Do It Best, 2004 WL 1660814, at *17.
166. See Pers. Keepsakes, Inc. v. Personalizationmall.com, Inc., No. 11 C 5177, 2012 WL 414803, at
*4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 8, 2012).
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Dastar court explicitly found that plagiarism was not a cause of
action in the first place.167 In fact, it was this resistance to plagiarism
as a cause of action that required the plaintiffs in Dastar turn to
trademark law instead. Without a right of attribution recognized in
copyright law, the plaintiffs’ recourse had to be to trademark law.
In light of Dastar’s preoccupation with physical goods, some
courts have distinguished the Lanham Act’s prohibition of false
authorship claims on goods from false authorship claims on services,
the latter of which these courts conclude are permitted.168 For
instance, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Gensler v.
Strabala overturned a lower court’s dismissal of Lanham Act claims
based on the Dastar precedent.169 In that case, Gensler asserted that
Strabala falsely claimed to be the architect who designed several
buildings.170 Copyright law protects architecture,171 and arguably
architecture is embodied in the goods of the building, much as the
copyrighted creativity behind Crusade in Europe was embodied in
the goods of the videotapes.172 However, the Gensler court
disregarded the existence of the buildings and viewed the issue as
being one of architectural services, whose origins were
misrepresented.173 This altered the entire analysis and permitted the
Lanham Act cause of action.174 A similar case in Puerto Rico
permitted a Lanham Act claim on false allegations of architectural
design without discussing Dastar.175 However, other courts have
disagreed that Dastar requires any distinction between goods and
services at all.176
167. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 36 (2003).
168. See id. at 31–32.
169. Gensler v. Strabala, 764 F.3d 735, 737 (7th Cir. 2014).
170. Id. at 736–37.
171. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(8) (2012).
172. See also EMI Catalogue P’ship v. Hill, Holliday, Connors, Cosmopulos Inc., 228 F.3d 56, 63 (2d
Cir. 2000) (noting that “the musical composition is the product” in the same way that buildings are the
product in architecture).
173. Gensler, 764 F.3d at 737.
174. The Gensler court concluded that no copyright claim would have been possible, so a Lanham
Act claim was the only cause of action left to the plaintiff. See id.
175. See Landrau v. Solis Betancourt, 554 F. Supp. 2d 102, 109 (D.P.R. 2007).
176. See Sidem, S.A. v. Aquatech Int’l Corp., No. 10-81, 2010 WL 2573882, at *8 (W.D. Pa. June 23,
2010).

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol32/iss2/4

26

Lantagne: The Copymark Creep

2016]

THE COPYMARK CREEP

485

ii. The Language Problem
In addition, Dastar dealt entirely with a cause of action under
§ 43(a)(1)(A),177 focusing on the “origin” language.178 However,
courts have attempted to carry Dastar’s reasoning over to causes of
action under § 43(a)(1)(B), a section of the statute dealing with the
“nature, characteristics, [and] quality” of the goods, rather than with
the origin.179 In order to remain consistent with the Dastar holding,
courts determine that the authorship of the good is not part of its
nature.180 While this makes some logical sense with the Dastar
decision,181 it does so at the expense of common sense; there are few
authors who would agree that authorship is unrelated to the nature of
their goods. In fact, other courts in dicta have listed things like
“original . . . artist” of a karaoke recording as being related to the
nature, characteristics and quality of the good,182 and the relationship
of the original artist to a karaoke recording is, at its heart, one of
authorship.183 Courts prior to the Dastar decision seemed to agree
with the idea that the clarity regarding authorship of the “good” was
important.184 Indeed, courts even found that a lack of clarity would
cause irreparable harm.185
The jurisprudence in the wake of Dastar is therefore characterized
by a great deal of technical hair splitting. One district found that
177. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 31 (2003).
178. Likewise, Dastar leaves open the question of how copyright infringement interacts with a
dilution cause of action. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Megaupload Ltd., No. 11cv0191-IEG (BLM), 2011 WL
3203117, at *8 (S.D. Cal. July 27, 2011).
179. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (2012).
180. See Baden Sports, Inc. v. Molten U.S.A., Inc., 556 F.3d 1300, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2009); M. Arthur
Gensler, Jr. & Assocs., Inc. v. Strabala, No. 11 C 3945, 2012 WL 600679, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 21,
2012); Smartix Int’l Corp. v. MasterCard Int’l LLC, No. 06 CV 5174(GBD), 2008 WL 4444554, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2008); Thomas Publ’g Co. v. Tech. Evaluation Ctrs., Inc., No. 06 Civ.
14212(RMB), 2007 WL 2193964, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2007); Antidote Int’l Films, Inc. v.
Bloomsbury Publ’g, PLC, 467 F. Supp. 2d 394, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
181. See Baden, 556 F.3d at 1308 (“To find otherwise . . . is contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s
interpretation of Dastar.”).
182. Sybersound Records, Inc. v. UAV Corp., 517 F.3d 1137, 1144 (9th Cir. 2008).
183. See id.
184. See, e.g., Rich v. RCA Corp., 390 F. Supp. 530, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (finding that using a
current photograph of a singer when the singer had recorded the songs years earlier was sufficient to
deceive people regarding the goods and support a Lanham Act cause of action).
185. See id.
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improper use of the words “proprietary” or “exclusive” was
preempted by the Copyright Act, but not improper use of the word
“innovative,”186 while on appeal the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit found the dispute nothing more than “an attempt to avoid the
holding in Dastar . . . .”187 In a different case, the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania concluded that an allegation that defendant’s product
had originally been created by plaintiff were barred by Dastar, but an
allegation that defendant stole plaintiff’s product was not barred by
Dastar.188
Meanwhile, faced with a brochure that was largely plagiarized, a
district court in Colorado found one Lanham Act cause of action
precluded by Dastar, but allowed another to go forward because the
unactionable misrepresentation of whose brochure it was might
create confusion that the plagiarized party had approved the
brochure.189 Thus, the false designation of origin claim was thrown
out as a result of Dastar’s preoccupation with origin.190 But the false
designation of sponsorship or approval claim, based on the same
activities with the brochure, survived.191
b. Sherlock Holmes and the Case of the Copymark Creep
One of the most notable recent copyright cases involved the
copyright status of the famous detective Sherlock Holmes.192 This
case illustrates the fact that the Dastar decision did little to directly
address the root of the copymark issue.
Sherlock Holmes has long been a copyrighted work with a
confusing status.193 The character of Holmes appears in fifty-six

186. Baden, 556 F.3d at 1306–07.
187. Id. at 1307.
188. See ZS Assocs., Inc. v. Synygy, Inc., No. 10-4274, 2011 WL 2038513, at *11 (E.D. Pa. May 23,
2011).
189. See MDM Grp. Assocs., Inc. v. ResortQuest Int’l, Inc., No. 06-cv-01518-PSF-KLM, 2007 WL
2909408, at *7 (D. Colo. Oct. 1, 2007).
190. Id. at *8.
191. Id. at *7; see also Auscape Int’l v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 409 F. Supp. 2d 235, 251 (S.D.N.Y.
2004).
192. Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd., 755 F.3d 496, 497 (7th Cir. 2014).
193. E.g., Lavigne, supra note 16, at 342–43.
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stories and four novels published between 1887 and 1927.194 The
final ten stories remain under copyright, while the rest of the stories,
and all of the novels, are in the public domain.195
Leslie Klinger was editing an anthology called A Study in
Sherlock: Stories Inspired by the Sherlock Holmes Canon.196 The
stories contained in the anthology were “inspired by” the Sherlock
Holmes stories and usually contained Holmes and his partner Dr.
Watson as characters.197 When the Conan Doyle Estate, holders of
the copyright on the ten final stories, learned of the anthology, they
contacted Klinger’s publisher and requested that he obtain a
copyright license.198 Klinger’s publishing company paid the licensing
fee and the anthology was published.199
A few years later, Klinger decided to edit a second anthology of
Sherlock-Holmes-inspired stories.200 This time Klinger’s publishing
company balked at paying the Conan Doyle Estate’s requested
licensing fee and left payment of the fee to Klinger. 201 Klinger,
however, refused to pay the fee, asserting that he was allowed to use
material from all the public domain Sherlock Holmes stories, so that
the Conan Doyle Estate could demand a licensing fee only if he was
using material from the ten stories still under copyright.202
The Conan Doyle Estate, at this point, confronted the crux of the
issue: Traditional copyright law did not provide them with the level
of protection they needed. Traditional copyright law protected the
original elements of creative expression in the final ten stories, but
traditional copyright law did not protect anything in the first forty-six
stories and the four novels. Unfortunately for the Conan Doyle
Estate, the characters of Sherlock Holmes and Dr. Watson appeared

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
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in all of the public domain materials, which seemed to leave them
open for anyone to use.
Therefore, in order to prevent Klinger and others from using the
characters of Sherlock Holmes and Dr. Watson, the Conan Doyle
Estate needed something more than traditional copyright. The estate
argued that the characters were not fully complete until the final story
was complete, so that anyone trying to use those characters would
inevitably have to use original creative expression that was still
copyrighted.203 The issue in the case centered on when a character
falls into the public domain; the first time it appears, or the last time
it appears.204 However, the debate was really about copymark.
It is by no means an inevitable conclusion that a character such as
Sherlock Holmes is entitled to copyright protection in the first
place.205 “Copyright is relatively difficult to obtain for literary
characters . . . .”206 Only distinct characters that are not stereotypes or
stock characters can be copyrighted.207 A character that is not
sufficiently delineated exists only as an “idea” that cannot be
copyrighted.208 “[T]he less developed the characters, the less they can
be copyrighted; that is the penalty an author must bear for marking
them too indistinctly.”209 To decide otherwise would grant “a
monopoly in a particular type of person.”210
A character’s specific name and appearance is copyrightable and
the copying thereof can be copyright infringement.211 Klinger
203. Id.
204. See id.
205. See Foley, supra note 19, at 938 (“[E]valuating whether a fictional character is a proper subject
for copyright protection is an unavoidable threshold issue in the copyright infringement analysis.”).
206. Abramowicz, supra note 64, at 364.
207. See, e.g., Detective Comics, Inc. v. Bruns Publ’ns, 111 F.2d 432, 433–34 (2d Cir. 1940);
Burroughs v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 388, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
208. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
209. Id.
210. Abramowicz, supra note 64, at 364–65.
211. See Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd., 755 F.3d 496, 503 (7th Cir. 2014) (construing Gaiman
v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 660 (7th Cir. 2004)). Interestingly, courts have implied that written
characters sometimes may not become sufficiently distinctive until they are combined with a visual cue.
See Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 660–61. The famous deerstalker cap and pipe that characterize most people’s
visions of Sherlock Holmes are not found in the stories. See, e.g., Sherlock Holmes: A Hero for His
Time—and Ours, DISCOVERING ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, sherlockholmes.stanford.edu/biography_
elusive.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2015). Nor did Holmes ever deliver the line “Elementary, my dear
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wished, presumably, to use the name and description of Sherlock
Holmes in the stories, but if the stories were merely “inspired” by the
Sherlock Holmes canon, did not have a character named Sherlock
Holmes, and merely contained a character who was a brilliant
detective, the copyright infringement case is not nearly so clear-cut.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit therefore properly
treated the Conan Doyle Estate as making “arguments for enlarged
copyright protection.”212 The court acknowledged that the original
elements of the final ten stories still enjoy copyright protection, but
the Conan Doyle Estate could not thereby rope in the rest of the
stories that had entered the public domain.213
The Conan Doyle Estate argued that refusing to give an author
protection in a character dating from the character being
“perfect[ed]” in the final work would destroy “incentive to improve
the character in future work . . . .”214 “If he loses copyright on the
original character . . . he’ll be competing with copiers.”215 This
argument is bewildering as a matter of copyright law, because the
copyright term lasts for the life of the author plus seventy years.216
No author should lose copyright in an actual copyrightable character
while he or she is alive, and therefore, no author should be competing
with copiers. As the court acknowledged, in the particular
circumstances of this case, Conan Doyle had been dead over eighty
years.217 This is typical; only once an author has been dead many
decades do you have a discussion about public domain materials.218
At any rate, the refusal of the law to protect vague and indistinctly
drawn characters already disincentivizes authors to take their time
perfecting characters.
Watson” in the stories. See id.
212. Klinger, 755 F.3d at 498; see also Helfand, supra note 10, at 652 (noting the same danger in
allowing the importation of trademark law tests to expand copyright protection “to protect against the
use of characters that are less and less similar”).
213. Klinger, 755 F.3d at 501.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012).
217. Klinger, 755 F.3d at 501.
218. Corporate authors, of course, cannot “die” in the way humans can, so they enjoy their own term
of copyright protection. 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (2012).
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The Conan Doyle Estate’s arguments boiled down to matters of
trademark law, although they were not framed that way; the Conan
Doyle Estate wished to use Sherlock Holmes as a trademark. They
wished to control the source from which he emanates for as long as
they desired.219
The Seventh Circuit indirectly acknowledged this in the final
paragraphs of the opinion, noting that what the Conan Doyle Estate
really sought was trademark dilution protection. The estate wanted
the Sherlock Holmes character only used in a manner it approved, out
of fear that otherwise deterred consumers would diminish the value
of its property.220 But, the court pointed out, “[t]here is no
comparable doctrine of copyright law . . . .”221
Thus, the Sherlock Holmes case stands as a copymark case; one in
which the copyright holder seeks to expand its monopoly through
trademark law. However, it is also not a Dastar case, illustrating the
major shortcoming of Dastar; the copymark problem is much more
pervasive than a reverse passing off case on a public domain
copyrighted work. Therefore, to the extent to which Dastar can even
be understood as sensible precedent, it fails to address the heart of the
copymark issue.
D. The Danger of the Copymark Creep
As noted, copyright is a careful balance between the monopoly
rights of the copyright holders to exclude the uses of others, and the
rights of the public.222 The public benefit from the copyright balance
manifests itself in two ways. First, the public’s access to the growing
public domain; and second, the public’s right to exercise their First
219. The idea of an author trying to enjoy rights that might not explicitly belong to him has been
endorsed not only by the conflation of intellectual property concepts that has been discussed thus far,
but also by precedent providing authors with copyright in characters through implication in the absence
of any express language otherwise. See Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 102 F.
Supp. 141, 145 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
220. See Klinger, 755 F.3d at 503.
221. Id. But see DC Comics Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Bus., 598 F. Supp. 110, 118–19 (N.D. Ga.
1984) (explicitly looking at trademark dilution harm in the context of evaluating a fair use defense to
copyright infringement).
222. See Moffat supra note 6 at 1476–77.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol32/iss2/4

32

Lantagne: The Copymark Creep

2016]

THE COPYMARK CREEP

491

Amendment free speech rights by engaging with copyright-protected
works.223
1. The Danger to the Public Domain
Commentators have noted that copyright owners can treat their
goods more like trademarked goods in order to win the expanded
protection of trademark law.224 Such activity can be “an
anticompetitive measure.”225 It is an effort to capture what they
perceive as the more favorable trademark protection for their work.226
Copyright protection might restrict the original expression and some
circle of substantially similar works, whereas trademark law permits
the copyrighted creation to be scattered throughout merchandising.227
In this way, the copyrighted item itself becomes a trademark.228 This
overtly lays the basis for continued protection once the copyright
term expires.229 Indeed, the very ubiquity of this practice has swayed
some courts to protect characters based not on law, but on the “public
expectation that merchandise displaying elements of a fictional
character is at least sponsored by the owner of the character.”230
The trademark protection period has no set expiration date, unlike
copyright law.231 The “potentially perpetual” protection period
223. See id. at 1481.
224. See LaFrance, supra note 134, at 73.
225. Id. at 75; see also Arewa, supra note 16, at 292 (discussing anticompetitive use of the DMCA).
226. See LaFrance, supra note 134, at 73.
227. See, e.g., Helfand, supra note 10, at 626–27; Liu, supra note 16, at 1428; Foley, supra note 19, at
937, 948; Pacelli, supra note 15, at 1250–51, 1264.
228. See Liu, supra note 16, at 1434.
229. See Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 34, at 1498.
230. Foley, supra note 19, at 949.
231. See, e.g., Woodrow Barfield, Intellectual Property Rights in Virtual Environments: Considering
the Rights of Owners, Programmers and Virtual Avatars, 39 AKRON L. REV. 649, 678 (2006); Foley,
supra note 19, at 939 (“Trademark protection . . . may . . . persist in perpetuity.”); Helfand, supra note
10, at 657; Liu, supra note 16, at 1427 (“Unlike copyright law, trademark law places no temporal limit
on the length of protection.”); Moffat, supra note 6, at 1494 (“[T]he term of trademark protection has
always been indefinite, with protection lasting as long as the mark is used (unless the mark becomes
generic) . . . .”); Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 34, at 1459 (“[T]rademark protection is, in
principle, infinite in duration.”); Laurie Richter, Reproductive Freedom: Striking a Fair Balance
Between Copyright and Other Intellectual Property Protection in Cartoon Characters, 21 ST. THOMAS
L. REV. 441, 467 (2009) (“[T]rademark rights do not expire as long as the mark qualifies for protection;
therefore it is in the owner’s best interest to attempt to obtain trademark rights in conjunction with their
copyright.”); Sander, supra note 27, at 22 (“[T]rademarks . . . can last for an unlimited amount of
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reflects the different purpose of trademark law.232 Because trademark
law is about protecting the consuming public from confusion rather
than incentivizing further creativity, “there is no reason why
trademarks should ever pass into the public domain by the mere
passage of time.”233 Trademark law focuses on the smooth operation
of commerce and has little interest in promoting expanded use of its
subjects. Copyright law, on the other hand, has the opposite goal.234
It seeks to “enrich[] . . . the public domain.”235 This is its
constitutionally stated purpose,236 and constitutionally a copyright
cannot be perpetual, but must only last “for limited [t]imes.”237 That
makes trademark a more attractive protective mechanism as a
copyright holder.238 In fact, copyright holders have even used these
trademark ideas to justify further expansion of the copyright term
limit itself.239
Because trademark law is not worried about ensuring that works
enter the public domain, there is no mechanism under the Lanham
Act to shepherd trademarks toward the public domain.240 Therefore,
using trademark law to cover works more traditionally covered under
copyright permits a strangulation of the public domain.241

time.”); Saval, supra note 34, at 420 (“[T]he duration of a trademark is potentially perpetual . . . .”). But
see Pacelli, supra note 15, at 1263 (arguing that copyright protection could be considered stronger if
Congress continues to expand the term, because, unlike trademark, copyright protection cannot be lost
through inactivity).
232. Helfand, supra note 10, at 637.
233. Id. at 657 (quoting Boston Prof’l Hockey Assoc. v. Dallas Cap. & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d
1004, 1011 (5th Cir. 1975)).
234. Id.
235. Moffat, supra note 6, at 1482; see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417, 429 (1984); Foley, supra note 19, at 924.
236. Walterscheid, supra note 21, at 239 (“The ultimate purpose of . . . copyrights in the United States
is to enlarge the public domain of creative works by authors and inventors, thereby promoting ‘the
progress of science and useful arts.’”) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8); Litman, supra note 22, at
433.
237. Moffat, supra note 6, at 1481 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8); Lavigne, supra note 16, at
357; Walterscheid, supra note 21, at 241, 245.
238. Copyright holders have, at times, explicitly stated a belief that “copyright should last as long as
possible.” Litman, supra note 22, at 431.
239. See, e.g., Buccafusco & Heald, supra note 25, at 16–17.
240. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012).
241. See Litman, supra note 22, at 435; Saval, supra note 34, at 446; Liu, supra note 16, at 1398.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol32/iss2/4

34

Lantagne: The Copymark Creep

2016]

THE COPYMARK CREEP

493

Disney is one of the foremost practitioners of using both copyright
and trademark protection; although, Disney is by no means alone.242
Commentators have noted that Disney is in favor of copyright
extensions in order to protect “Steamboat Willie,” which is on the
cusp of falling into the public domain.243 As others have pointed out,
surely the many changes that Disney has instituted between
“Steamboat Willie” and the current iteration of Mickey Mouse are
copyrightable and would protect the current version of Mickey
Mouse.244 But Disney wants to keep Mickey Mouse out of the fray
altogether.245 If Steamboat Willie falls into the public domain,
Disney is aware that an argument exists that some iteration of
Mickey Mouse is in the public domain246—regardless of the
occurrence of the last copyrighted use of Mickey Mouse.247
Therefore, Disney seeks to supplement its copyright protection by
relying on Mickey Mouse as a trademark.
The arguments of the Conan Doyle Estate illustrate the way in
which copyright holders want to achieve trademark protection: If
they are continuing to license uses of Sherlock Holmes, then what is
to stop them from continuing to expand the copyright term based on
the last time their copyrighted character was used?248 Put that way,
242. See, e.g., Abramowicz, supra note 64, at 369; Buccafusco & Heald, supra note 25, at 7–8;
Douglas A. Hedenkamp, Free Mickey Mouse: Copyright Notice, Derivative Works, and the Copyright
Act of 1909, 2 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 254, 255 (2003); Richter, supra note 231, at 451, 460–61;
Sander, supra note 27, at 23; Dinitia Smith, Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey Mouse
Joins the Fray, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/03/28/arts/immortal-wordsimmortal-royalties-even-mickey-mouse-joins-the-fray.html?pagewanted=all.
243. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 242.
244. See Hedenkamp, supra note 242, at 266, 278; William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 491 (2003); Liu, supra note 16, at 1441–42;
Martin, supra note 36, at 318.
245. See generally Hedenkamp, supra note 242.
246. Some commentators have suggested that, despite Disney’s best efforts otherwise, Mickey Mouse
is already in the public domain. See, e.g., id. at 255.
247. See Richter, supra note 231, at 471–72.
248. The appellate court noted that the Conan Doyle Estate’s argument raised “[t]he spectre of
perpetual, or at least nearly perpetual, copyright . . . .” Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd., 755 F.3d
496, 503 (7th Cir. 2014); see also Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd., 988 F. Supp. 2d 879, 890 (N.D.
Ill. 2013) (“The effect of adopting Conan Doyle’s position would be to extend impermissibly the
copyright of certain character elements of Holmes and Watson beyond their statutory period . . . .”); Liu,
supra note 16, at 1452 (predicting that “parties may attempt to lay claim to works ostensibly in the
public domain by making small changes to a public domain work in an effort to retain or extend the
copyright and using the resultant uncertainty to limit free use”); Foley, supra note 19, at 935.
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the protection they sought for Sherlock Holmes begins to look not
like copyright, but more like how we understand Mickey Mouse to
function these days249: as a trademark that continues to receive
protection as long as it is being used. Mickey Mouse is a well-known
trademark; Sherlock Holmes, however, traditionally has not been
considered one, but the copyright holder wishes that it were.
2. The Danger to the First Amendment
Not only does the use of trademark law in copyright analyses
endanger the public domain, it also increases the limitations on those
uses that would have been permitted under the copyright law regime
of non-public-domain works. Traditionally copyright law talked very
little about its First Amendment implications in the silencing of
speech, relying instead on the fair use defense and the
idea/expression dichotomy.250 But these protections can only
properly protect in the copyright world, and they are powerless
against trademark law concepts.
Trademark’s “likelihood of confusion” standard presents an
attractive emotional appeal for copyright holders to fall back on
where copyright law might otherwise fail because of a lack of
substantial similarity between the works.251 Copyright holders are
drawn to the idea that confusion, in and of itself, is a harm for which
they should be compensated.252 The copyright infringement standard,
however, is substantial similarity, not confusion.253

249. Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 659 (7th Cir. 2004); Burgunder, supra note 27, at 258, 290;
Landes & Posner, supra note 244, at 491; Liu, supra note 16, at 1424, 1428; Martin, supra note 36, at
317 (“Disney was not, in fact, ever at risk of losing all of its rights to Mickey Mouse, which is a
trademarked character.”); Moffat, supra note 6, at 1496; Pacelli, supra note 15, at 1250–51; Saval,
supra note 34, at 441.
250. Matthew D. Bunker & Clay Calvert, The Jurisprudence of Transformation: Intellectual
Incoherence and Doctrinal Murkiness Twenty Years after Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 12 DUKE L.
& TECH. REV. 92, 95 (2014); Hollows, supra note 19, at 301–02; Martin, supra note 36, at 270, 302.
Commentators have noted that these doctrines perform this task only semi-effectively. See Liu, supra
note 16, at 1418.
251. See Lyons P’ship v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 804 (4th Cir. 2001).
252. See, e.g., Orange, supra note 45 (noting that copyright holders treat the elimination of confusion
as fixing the copyright infringement problem).
253. Lyons, 243 F.3d at 801.
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The “substantial similarity” test, like many of the most important
tests in copyright, is a difficult one to articulate.254 It is “necessarily
imprecise,”255 “one of the most uncertain questions in copyright and
‘one which is the least susceptible of helpful generalizations.’”256 “It
is . . . impossible to articulate a definitive demarcation that measures
when the similarity between works involves copying of protected
expression; decisions must inevitably be ad hoc.”257 As a result,
copyright infringement actions are haunted by complicated and
divisive tests involving debates over where to draw the lines between
expression and ideas, and whether this song sounds too much like
that song.258
In comparison, confusion seems like an impossibly simple thing to
measure and quantify. Indeed, it is tempting enough that appellate
courts have used evidence of confusion to overturn trial courts’
rulings on substantial similarity.259
In trademark law, most causes of action rest on a multi-factor
likelihood of confusion test.260 In the absence of consumer confusion,
trademark harm does not occur. 261 “In the absence of a likelihood of
consumer confusion, a finding of trademark infringement is an
unwarranted limitation on creativity and expression, for the
trademark owner’s rights have not been infringed.”262 Confusion is
thus the hallmark of trademark law.263
254. Id. at 801, (“The notion of [substantial] similarity can be a slippery one . . . .”); Hutchison, supra
note 128, at 112; Rennie, supra note 16, at 67.
255. Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1356 (9th Cir. 1990).
256. Leslie A. Kurtz, The Independent Legal Lives of Fictional Characters, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 429,
472 (1986).
257. Shaw, 919 F.2d at 1356 (citing Sid & Marty Television Prods. Inc., v. McDonald’s Corp., 562
F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977).
258. See Lee, supra note 57, at 1480 (“The basic test of substantial similarity for infringement—
which is vital for the public to evaluate whether its conduct is permissible—is, unfortunately, ‘largely
subjective, thus permitting the finder of fact to give effect to its intuitive judgment of the perceived
equities in a case.’”) (quoting Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 1005 (1990)).
259. Lyons, 243 F.3d at 802; see also Warner Bros. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 246 (2d Cir.
1983) (referring to the finding of substantial similarity and likelihood of confusion as if they are the
same test and the same cause of action).
260. Lyons, 243 F.3d at 804.
261. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Megaupload Ltd., No. 11cv0191-IEG (BLM), 2011 WL 3203117, at *8
(S.D. Cal. July 27, 2011) (criticizing trademark allegations for failing to ever use the word “confusion”).
262. Foley, supra note 19, at 946–47.
263. Lyons, 243 F.3d at 804; GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1205 (9th Cir.
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While confusion undeniably plays a role in copyright law due to
the danger of misrepresentation inherent in any copyright
infringement,264 confusion is not the hallmark of copyright law in the
way that it is in trademark law.265 The substantial similarity test does
not necessarily hinge on confusion to the extent that trademark law
does. Unlike trademark infringement, copyright infringement can
exist even if no one is confused.266
Copyright holders turn to trademark law to avoid the morass of
debate over substantial similarity. A copyright holder can never be
sure how a substantial similarity analysis might turn out, but a
measure of consumer confusion is an irresistibly easy thing to set out.
It seems to the copyright holder like a way to sneak a bright line rule
into an arena of the law that is notoriously resistant to such rules.
Also, it has the added bonus of sounding like something the law
should concern itself with on a basic fairness level.
The likelihood of confusion standard is even more appealing given
how much it has grown in recent years.267 Recourse to likelihood of
confusion means that a copyright holder need only prove that some
percentage of consumers (in trademark law, the percentage can be as
low as ten percent)268 was confused at some point in time, however
briefly, even if that confusion was later dispelled.269
The danger in allowing the importation of such a standard,
however, is that it diminishes the protective power of traditional
copyright measures that promote the proliferation of expressive uses
2000) (“The likelihood of confusion is the central element of trademark infringement . . . .”); Universal
City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., 746 F.2d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 1984); Int’l Order of Job’s Daughters v.
Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 917 (9th Cir. 1980); Meyer v. Rodex Sales & Servs., LLC, No. CV 05176-S-MHW, 2006 WL 3355004, at *9 (D. Idaho Nov. 16, 2006) (“A key purpose of the Lanham Act is
avoidance of confusing the public.”); Helfand, supra note 10, at 636 (“Proof of consumer confusion is
the most crucial element of a trademark infringement cause of action.”); Kozinski, supra note 63, at 468
(“[A]t the core of trademark law is the issue of confusion.”); Sander, supra note 27, at 21; Saval, supra
note 34, at 420 (“Proof of consumer confusion is the crucial element of a trademark infringement cause
of action . . . .”).
264. See Lacour v. Time Warner Inc., No. 99 C 7105, 2000 WL 688946, at *8 (N.D. Ill. May 24,
2000).
265. See, e.g., Waldman Publ’g Corp. v. Landoll, Inc., 43 F.3d 775, 781 (2d Cir. 1994).
266. Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1364–65 (9th Cir. 1990).
267. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769, 774 (8th Cir. 1994).
268. Id. at 775.
269. Liu, supra note 16, at 1429.
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in support of the public’s First Amendment free speech rights.270 For
instance, under copyright law, a fair use defense might protect a
parody.271 However, consumer confusion might conceivably still
exist and act to work against the application of fair use, finding
trademark infringement where copyright infringement would not
have existed.272
If copyright holders cannot prove confusion, they still have the
concept of tarnishment or blurring to turn to.273 These ideas—that
particular conduct is damaging one’s reputation or strength in the
marketplace274—are trademark concepts found in the dilution cause
of action, that copyright holders seek to use to gain more control in
how their copyrighted works can be used by others.275 There are
many First Amendment implications in the protection provided,
especially by tarnishment law, because it provides a rights holder
with the ability to silence a speaker who it finds offensive.276 Using
this law, copyright holders can chip away at the amount of protection
provided to parody.277

270. See Sander, supra note 27, at 1; Foley, supra note 19, at 953.
271. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (2012).
272. See Helfand, supra note 10, at 653 (noting that “one might defend against a copyright
infringement action by asserting a fair use parody and yet not be able to disprove consumer confusion”);
Saval, supra note 34, at 423 (discussing that copyright holders can “use trademark law to circumvent
what copyright law may allow under fair use”); Foley, supra note 19, at 954; Sander, supra note 27, at
21.
273. Foley, supra note 19, at 951 (“[D]ilution provides broad protection in the absence of a likelihood
of consumer confusion . . . .”).
274. Liu, supra note 16, at 1438.
275. See Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd., 755 F.3d 496, 503 (7th Cir. 2014); Galerie Furstenberg
v. Coffaro, 697 F. Supp. 1282, 1291 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Frederick Warne & Co. v. Book Sales Inc., 481
F. Supp. 1191, 1199 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Helfand, supra note 10, at 627; Dennis S. Karjala, Harry
Potter, Tanya Grotter, and the Copyright Derivative Work, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 17, 35–36 (2006); Liu,
supra note 16, at 1438; Jacqueline Lai Chung, Note, Drawing Idea from Expression: Creating a Legal
Space for Culturally Appropriated Literary Characters, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 903, 936 (2007).
276. See Gardner, supra note 53.
277. See DC Comics Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Bus., 598 F. Supp. 110, 118–19 (N.D. Ga. 1984);
Gardner, supra note 53.
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II. TURNING TO FAN COMMUNITY PRACTICES TO BALANCE
COPYMARK CREEP
Fan communities define themselves by reference to a copyrighted
work whose rights belong to other entities.278 As such, they
inevitably confront copyright issues regularly as a fact of their very
existence.
While all fan communities do not speak with one voice, a number
of recurring characteristics and attitudes have coalesced into a
recognizable set of unwritten rules.279 These rules attempt to provide
some protection of the rights of the creator of the original
copyrighted work while simultaneously encouraging a flourishing
creative atmosphere among the fan creators engaging with the work.
In short, these rules seek the traditional copyright balance.280
Fan communities have developed largely independent of formal
legal advice and detailed statutory knowledge because these
communities have normally been located only at the fringe of
mainstream creative culture.281 These communities did not set out to
rewrite copyright law.282 Rather, the balance they struck developed
organically and intuitively from their understanding of how the law
works.283 They were worried about what would be “fair,” not
necessarily what was legal. In their actions, they instinctively
recognized the copymark creep and sought to limit its effects.284

278. See, e.g., a blackpanther, What Fanfic is and isn’t, OBSERVATION DECK (Dec. 2, 2013, 8:24
AM), http://observationdeck.kinja.com/what-fanfic-is-and-isnt-509492028 (defining “fandom” as a
group of people who “spend their free time interacting with the canon source in ways that aren’t
standard, i.e. more than just watching, reading or playing something deciding ‘hey, I kinda like that’
[sic]. It’s fanfic writers, fanartists, cosplayers, readers of fanfiction, people who hang around the forums
discussing all the details and so on.”).
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Henry Jenkins, Citizen Fan: An Interview with Filmmaker Emmanuelle Wielezynski-Debats
(Part Two), CONFESSIONS OF AN ACA-FAN THE OFFICIAL WEBLOG OF HENRY JENKINS (Oct. 6, 2014),
http://henryjenkins.org/2014/10/citizen-fan-an-interview-with-filmmaker-emmanuelle-wielezynskidebats-part-two.html (quoting Emmanuelle Wielezynski-Debats as referring to fandom as “folk
culture”).
282. See Lee, supra note 57, at 1473.
283. Id. at 1461.
284. Id.
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The rules established by fan communities betray an attraction to
bright line rules; in the vacuum left behind by copyright precedent,
those most affected by copyright have found their own way. And,
given the trademark character of most copyright discussions, it is
unsurprising that fan communities have unconsciously drawn these
bright line rules from trademark law—not copyright.285 In this way,
fan communities have used trademark law concepts to offset the
damage done by these same concepts to the public domain and free
speech balance of copyright.
A. Fan Community Understanding of Trademark Law
There does not seem to be a conscious understanding of trademark
law concepts as opposed to copyright law concepts because fan
communities are composed primarily of laypeople as opposed to
lawyers. However, the practices of fan communities can be readily
understood in a trademark law context—more so than a copyright
law context.
1. Embracing Trademark’s Likelihood of Confusion Standard
Much as copyright holders appear to like trademark’s confusion
standard, fan communities have followed; if there is no confusion as
to who is responsible for which part of a piece of creativity, fan
communities support that piece of creativity.286
Fan creators frequently place disclaimers in front of their works,
emphasizing what they have “borrowed” from other people and what
is their own work.287 This permits them to define ownership (“I own
this, but J.K. Rowling owns that”) while continuing to use that which

285. See wtfzurtopic, Comment to Was Fanfic any Fifferent in the Olden Days, TUMBLR.COM (Jan.25,
2015), http://nonasuch.tumblr.com/post/109152651195/was-fanfic-any-different-in-the-olden-days.
286. See jennlynnfs, FANFICTION, https://www.fanfiction.net/u/873760/jennlynnfs (last visited Nov.
14, 2015).
287. See Lee, supra note 57, at 1534; wtfzurtopic, supra note 285; see also Orange, supra note 45
(reporting that the parties decided the solution to alleged copyright infringement was a disclaimer);
Natasha Simonova, Fan fiction and the Author in the Early 17th Century: The Case of Sidney’s Arcadia,
TRANSFORMATIVE WORKS & CULTURES (2012), http://journal.transformativeworks.org/index.php/
twc/article/view/399/314.
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they acknowledge does not belong to them. The thinking seems to be
that the disclaimer dispels any confusion that might exist.288 But, as
has been discussed, confusion is a trademark law concept; it has little
effect on a copyright infringement analysis.289 In fact, the concept of
disclaimers is more prevalent in trademark law.290
Fans also encourage using proper “sourcing,” providing original
links or otherwise crediting the original in some way.291 Fan
communities recognize the value of the very attribution right
dismissed by the Supreme Court in Dastar, betraying how much they
view copyright through a trademark lens.292
This desire to make sure that consumers are informed about what
type of creativity they are getting shows up in other fan practices,
too, like the mania for “trigger warnings” and “tagging,” to give
people a clear view of what is coming in a fanwork.293
The rules that fan communities have established set forth when fan
creators have gone too far, and generally that runs along the
trademark law “passing off” fault.294 Taking someone’s work, either
wholesale or as unmistakable inspiration, without providing proper
credit, is frowned upon by fan communities.295 Notably, such a
practice would lead to consumer confusion as to where the work in
question originated (hence why it is prohibited by trademark law).

288. See Orange, supra note 45 (“They put these disclaimers on so kids . . . don’t confuse . . . .”).
289. See Lee, supra note 57, at 1534.
290. See Home Box Office, Inc. v. Showtime/The Movie Channel, Inc., 832 F.2d 1311, 1315 (2d Cir.
1987).
291. See,
e.g.,
jennlynnfs,
supra
note
286;
Kambria
Rain,
FANFICTION,
https://www.fanfiction.net/u/1688000/Kambria-Rain (last visited Nov. 14, 2015); George deValier,
FANFICTION, https://www.fanfiction.net/u/2348750/George-deValier (last visited Nov. 14, 2015);
Blanket Permission to Podfic, FANLORE, http://fanlore.org/wiki/Blanket_Permission_to_Podfic (last
visited Nov. 14, 2015); REDDIT, http://www.reddit.com/r/fandomnatural/wiki/index (last visited Nov.
14, 2015); room_317, Chapter 1, LIVEJOURNAL (Apr. 28, 2012, 10:01 PM), http://room317.livejournal.com/.
292. See, e.g., jennlynnfs, supra note 286; Kambria Rain, supra note 291. See also Dastar Corp. v.
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 36 (2003) (likening passing off as applied in a
copyright context to plagiarism).
293. See wtfzurtopic, supra note 285.
294. See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 36 (likening passing off as applied in a copyright context to plagiarism).
295. See, e.g., Kambria Rain, supra note 291.
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2. Trademark’s Commercial—as Opposed to Creative—
Marketplace
Fan communities also traditionally drew a clear distinctive line
between “for profit” works and “free” works. Many works of
fanfiction will include a statement that the writer is not making
money off of the work.296 It is unclear if this is meant to insulate the
writer from being sued for money that does not exist, or if there is an
understanding that it is only “wrong” if you are making money off of
the original content creator.297
At any rate, trademark law, rooted in the Commerce Clause, must
focus on the commercial aspects of the conduct in question.298 While
commercial implications may play a role in copyright, they are not
the prerequisite fan communities frequently treat them as. Giving
something away for free does not insulate you from copyright
infringement
charges,299
as
many
fans
mistakenly
believe.300Copyright holders understandably fixate less on the
commercial emphasis of trademark law as opposed to copyright law,
mostly because, to them, all copyright law violations have a financial
aspect.301 This is a consequence of the overall “copymark creep”—
the tendency of copyrighted works to function more like trademarks
in a commercial marketplace. It is only natural that fan communities
instinctively seize upon traditional trademark defenses in response,
asserting their lack of commercialism to protect them.
Nevertheless, it is true that the monetization of some fanworks has
begun to occur;302 although in many instances it remains a hotly
contested issue.303 For example, some people sell costume replicas to
296. See wtfzurtopic, supra note 285.
297. See, e.g., Debora J. Halbert, The Labor of Creativity: Women’s Work, Quilting, and the
Uncommodified
Life,
TRANSFORMATIVE
WORKS
&
CULTURES
4.21
(2009),
http://journal.transformativeworks.org/index.php/twc/article/view/41/118.
298. See MCCARTHY supra note 30, § 6:2.
299. See, e.g., Stephanie Losi, RIAA Sues Hundreds in ‘First Wave’ of War, TECH NEWS WORLD
(Sept. 8, 2003, 3:30 PM PT), www.technewsworld.com/story/31525.html.
300. See Halbert, supra note 297, at 4.21.
301. See Foley, supra note 19, at 925.
302. See Falco276, Publishing Fanfictions for Profit?, FANFICTION (Dec. 5, 2013),
https://www.fanfiction.net/topic/2872/101834311/Publishing-Fanfictions-for-Profit.
303. Id.
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“cosplayers” so they can dress like their favorite characters.304 There
has been a movement to auction off custom-made pieces of fanworks
for various charities.305 The monetization seems especially central to
fanartists, who will accept commissions and also sell their works as
prints and other products.306 The rise of Kickstarter has also made the
monetization of fanworks easier, both for pieces of fanart307 and for
further transformative uses, like fanmade “movie” versions of
popular pieces of fanfiction.308 As fan activities become more
commercialized, the communities seem to be relying on the lack of
confusion with the original content creator to protect them.309
B. Fan Community Encouragement of Creative Activity
In the balance between the rights of the creator and the rights of
the public to engage with creative works, fan communities have used
trademark law to strengthen the public side of that balance.310 Fan
communities, attempting to narrow the copyright monopoly as much
as possible, treat trademark law as a limiting doctrine.311
The bright line rules established by fan communities provide for
greater clarity and predictability, thereby lowering transaction
costs.312 This has resulted in a general free-for-all of posting in which
anyone can upload anything, confident that, by the standards of the
fan communities, their work will be accepted on its own merits as

304. See Search results for “Cosplay Costume,” ETSY, https://www.etsy.com/market/cosplay_costume
(last visited Nov. 14, 2015).
305. See, e.g., A Fandom Auction to Help Haiti Recover, LIVEJOURNAL, http://helphaiti.livejournal.com/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2015).
306. Some of this monetization is even taking place in partnership with the copyright holder. See, e.g.,
Alan Wexelblat, Makers, Fan Art, Making It Pay, COPYFIGHT (Aug. 25, 2014),
https://www.primaryopinion.com/articles/makers-fan-art-making-it-pay .
307. See, e.g., Benjamin Henson, Destiny Custom Fan-Art T-Shirts, KICKSTARTER,
https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/benjaminhenson/destiny-custom-fan-art-t-shirts (last visited Nov.
14, 2015).
308. See
Naomi
Javor,
A
Finger
Slip:
Web
Series,
KICKSTARTER,
https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/1879289266/a-finger-slip-web-series (last visited Nov. 14, 2015).
309. See Artemis J. Potter, Comment to Publishing Fanfictions for Profit?, FANFICTION (Dec. 5,
2013), https://www.fanfiction.net/topic/2872/101834311/Publishing-Fanfictions-for-Profit.
310. Liu, supra note 16, at 1428.
311. Id.
312. See Lee, supra note 57, at 1485–86.
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long as they comply with the delineated standards.313 Therefore, the
fan community’s emphasis on commercialism provides a bright line
rule of predictability, leading people to feel assured of their safety in
asserting what they wish to say. This baseline encourages a freer (and
more free-for-all) creative dialogue.314
Likewise, the emphasis on consumer confusion also provides
greater clarity to the fan creator (it also does to the copyright
holder).315 As long as the fan creator is careful to provide proper
credit, then the fan creator feels secure in his or her acceptance in the
fan community.316
This environment leads to an ongoing tumble of transformative
uses of the works of others.317 Permission is often sought before such
uses are made318—striking given the fact that most fan creators do
not seek permission before engaging in their initial acts of
creation.319 However, permission also appears to be freely given,
given the profusion of ongoing uses that exist.320 It is clear that fans
believe creativity to be a dialogue.321 They ask permission frequently
because, comfortable in the delineated rules of their community, they
are confident that permission will be freely given and will be
withheld only occasionally. When permission becomes costly to seek
and uncertain to achieve, as it does in the more commercial
“copymark” world, it acts as a stumbling block that discourages
creativity.322
The overall effect of the fan community emphasis on trademark
law in traditionally copyright dictated regimes is an advancement of
the fan community goals: encouragement of creative collaboration
between the creator and the consumer. Fan communities have used
313. See, e.g., jennlynnfs, supra note 286; George deValier, supra note 291.
314. See Lee, supra note 57, at 1546.
315. Liu, supra note 16, at 1428.
316. See, e.g., jennlynnfs, supra note 286; George deValier, supra note 291; Blanket Permission,
supra note 291; REDDIT, http://www.reddit.com/r/fandomnatural/wiki/index (last visited Nov. 14, 2015).
317. Blanket Permission, supra note 291.
318. See, e.g., jennlynnfs, supra note 286; George deValier, supra note 291.
319. See Lee, supra note 57, at 1462.
320. Blanket Permission, supra note 291.
321. Id.
322. See Liu, supra note 16, at 1418; Lee, supra note 57, at 1532.
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their bright line rules influenced by trademark law to achieve the sort
of flourishing creativity that is copyright’s ultimate purpose.
III. USING THE INTERNET TO SAVE COPYRIGHT
The domain of copyright—books, movies, art, television—is part
of the larger culture. It is inevitable that social norms cropup around
these shared creative experiences, especially considering the muddle
of legal and statutory norms around them.
In a world where copyright holders appear drawn to a “copymark”
idea, the folk wisdom of fan communities should not be dismissed.
Copyright is a “carefully crafted bargain.”323 “In theory, when an
author obtains the protections of copyright law, society gets
something in exchange, including the increased production,
disclosure, and dissemination of creative works, the right to make fair
use of the copyrighted works, and the right to independently create
identical or substantially similar works.”324 This is an extremely
delicate balance,325 and the importation of trademark law concepts
into copyright law tips it; meaning that “the public may be deprived
of some of these bargained-for benefits.”326 Copyright holders
understandably support this shifting of balance, because they
benefit.327 However, when that bargain is shifted too far and the
public fails to benefit from copyright, then copyright protection itself
becomes “unjustified.”328 In fact, if trademark law is imported too

323. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150–51 (1989), quoted in Dastar
Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33 (2003); see also Moffat, supra note 6, at
1475 (referring to “the copyright bargain” and warning against “disrupting” it); Burgunder, supra note
27, at 287; Foley, supra note 19, at 924.
324. Moffat, supra note 6, at 1516.
325. Lavigne, supra note 16, at 316.
326. Moffat, supra note 6, at 1516; see also Litman, supra note 22, at 433 (“We give out exclusive
rights in return for, among other things, the dedication of the work to the public after a limited period of
time has expired.”).
327. Richter, supra note 231, at 472 (“The union of trademark, copyright, patent and other intellectual
property protections tends to benefit corporation and owners because creators reap all the
benefits . . . .”).
328. Foley, supra note 19, at 925.
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heavily into copyright law, it can be said that “the public receives
nothing in exchange.”329
This problem is illustrated by looking at the character of Santa
Claus. Commentators have noted that it is difficult to pinpoint an
“author” of the Santa Claus character; “[t]he name Santa Claus has
been traced back as far as 1773, while settlers brought the Duge
legend of Sinter Klaas to New York in the seventeenth century.”330
Therefore, these commentators say, there is no need to worry much
about how long individual drawings of Santa Claus might be
protected by copyright, because no one would ever be able to own
the idea of Santa Claus.331
This only works, though, if Santa Claus drawings stay copyrighted
instead of importing trademark law concepts. Given the state of the
law today, it is not a difficult leap to imagine that Thomas Nast,
whose nineteenth-century drawings of Santa Claus established much
of the modern vision of him we all possess today,332 might try to
claim an expanded protection using trademark law instead of
copyright. It might be laughable to imagine Santa Claus being owned
by copyright,333 but it is disturbingly plausible to imagine Santa
Claus being owned under a “copymark” idea.
The attitude of fan communities can be understood as an attempt to
recalibrate the balance. Permitting the bargain to remain upset
without correction skews the ability of copyright to achieve its
creativity-encouraging goals.334 Fan communities, representing the
“public” side of the copyright bargain, have instinctively found ways
to tip the scales back to a more even distribution.335 Therefore, there
is normative value to be gleaned in their reliance on the bright line
rules of trademark.

329. Id. at 957.
330. Martin, supra note 36, at 269.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 268–69.
334. Moffat, supra note 6, at 1474.
335. Richter, supra note 231, at 472 (“[T]he union [of trademark, copyright, patent, and other
intellectual property protections] should protect individuals and those who wish to parody and fairly use
the [works] . . . .”).
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What fan communities are doing is reacting to developments: in
the law, in the real world, and by copyright holders.336 These
reactions might be subconscious or instinctive, rather than deliberate,
but they should be valued for exactly that reason.337 Fan communities
should not be accused of distorting copyright law in a vacuum.338
Rather, this distortion should be seen as a correction of other
distortions.339 Without the fan communities’ organic bright line rules,
the delicate balance of copyright would shift too far in favor of the
copyright holders and too far away from the promotion of
progress.340
When copyright law looked more traditional rather than an
iteration of trademark law, the defenses built into the statute may
have made sense. However, as copyright law has continued to expand
to resemble a hybrid of copyright law and trademark law, the
traditional copyright defenses have begun to make less sense.
Moreover, the resistance to bright line rules that initially seemed to
encourage more speech has resulted in the opposite.
The fair use defense—copyright law’s primary free speech
protection—is messy and unpredictable.341 Indeed, some courts have
referred to it as “seem[ing] arbitrary.”342 It “leav[es] little guidance
for users of copyrighted works on whether a particular use is fair.”343
Its reliance on the injunction as a remedy—especially the preliminary
injunction344—results in extensive stifling of speech.345 Many
speakers will simply choose not to take the “gamble” of engaging in
336. See generally Jamar, supra note 128; Lee, supra note 57.
337. See generally Jamar, supra note 128; Lee, supra note 57.
338. See Lee, supra note 57, at 1483.
339. See generally Jamar, supra note 128; Lee, supra note 57.
340. Jamar, supra note 128, at 870.
341. Hill v. Whalen & Martell, Inc., 220 F. 359, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1914) (“It is not always easy to say
where the line should be drawn between the use which for such purposes is permitted and that which is
forbidden.”); Gardner, supra note 53; Goold, supra note 19, at 893; Lewis, supra note 19, at 268;
Thomas Plotkin & Tarae Howell, “Fair is Foul and Foul is Fair:” Have Insurers Loosened the
Chokepoint of Copyright and Permitted Fair Use’s Breathing Space in Documentary Films?, 15 CONN.
INS. L.J. 407, 408, 434 (2009); Richter, supra note 231, at 473 (“The fair use exception to the Copyright
Act is vague as there is no clear standard to determine whether a use should be deemed fair or unfair.”).
342. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 102 F. Supp. 141, 148 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
343. Lee, supra note 57, at 1480.
344. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 145, § 14.06(A)(1)(b) (2015).
345. See id. § 14.06(C)(1)(c) (2015).
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speech that might be found infringing based on vague and nebulous
standards.346 And those that do choose to speak may not have a
chance to do so before a judge orders them to stop through an
injunction.347
The power imbalance between many copyright holders and many
members of fan communities also illustrates the necessity of bright
line rules.348 Many fan community members have little understanding
of how the law works, so they have little understanding of how it can
operate to protect them.349 For instance, a Tumblr post explaining
that the DMCA can operate to protect artists whose work is stolen
was greeted with delighted surprise by Tumblr users who evidently
did not know about the possibility.350 But it also led to further
confusion, as Tumblr users portrayed a misunderstanding of what to
do with this information: The Tumblr DMCA page is used to address
copyright infringement involving other websites, not “re-posters,”
but there appeared to be confusion on this front.351
This situation is exacerbated where precedent is unclear and legal
status is uncertain, because copyright holders often exploit this
uncertainty to assert more than they are entitled to, hoping for
acquiescence on the part of the would-be speaker. The Klinger case
detailed earlier in this Article makes clear that Klinger thought he
had the right to use the public domain aspects of the Sherlock
Holmes characters.352 However, when confronted by the Conan
Doyle Estate, the publishing company capitulated and paid instead of
346. Richter, supra note 231, at 452; see also Bunker & Calvert, supra note 250, at 126; Lee, supra
note 57, at 1480 (characterizing the fair use defense as “act[ing] almost as a trap”); Monika Isia
Jasiewicz, Note, “A Dangerous Undertaking”: The Problem of Intentionalism and Promise of Expert
Testimony in Appropriation Art Infringement Cases, 26 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 143, 170 (2014)
(“Commentators have argued . . . that the doctrine’s lack of clarity will necessarily result in chilling
effects.”).
347. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 145,§ 14.06(A)(1)(a) (2015).
348. Jamar, supra note 128, at 856–57 (“[U]ser-creators need to rely upon the vagaries of fair use or
the abstractions of the idea/expression dichotomy concept. A better, brighter line should be
developed . . . .”).
349. See, e.g., jolly-godflies, If Your Art Gets Stolen, TUMBLR, http://smargo64.tumblr.com/post/
109659843015/if-your-art-gets-stolen (last visited Nov. 14, 2015).
350. Id. (linking to DMCA Copyright Notifications, TUMBLR, http://www.tumblr.com/dmca (last
visited Nov. 14, 2015)).
351. Id.
352. Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd., 755 F.3d 496, 497 (7th Cir. 2014).
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fighting,353 which perpetuated further years of confusion on the
copyrighted status of Holmes and led to years of work that was in the
public domain being treated as if it was not.354 The resulting limit to
the public domain is a societal cost that copyright does not support.355
Even if one is confident that one’s speech will not be infringing
based on fair use, the lack of clear standards makes the probability
that a copyright holder will still complain about such a use high. For
instance, a one-man show entitled “My Princess Bride” received a
cease-and-desist letter apparently alleging copyright infringement of
the movie The Princess Bride, the book The Princess Bride, or
both.356 This situation was distressing to the originators of the “My
Princess Bride” show because they had done “some research to
ensure they weren’t infringing on copyright, and they
were . . . ’comfortable and confident it was fair use . . . .’”357
Nevertheless, in the face of the cease and desist letter, the show’s
creators canceled it, in part based on “caution and prudence,” even
though they continued to believe the show was permissible under fair
use, but also because many venues refused to mount the show with
its cloud of copyright infringement allegations.358
Given the unpredictability of fair use cases, it would be difficult to
deter such actions by copyright holders based on sanctions. If there is
a good faith basis to believe in the action—and the lack of clear-cut
rules makes such a basis likely—then the conduct is acceptable.359
The fair use defense is usually available in situations where its
expense is prohibitive:

353. Id.; see also Jasiewicz, supra note 346, at 170 (“The trend toward settlement . . . seems to
indicate that many artists are not willing to take the risk of litigation when there is so much uncertainty
inherent in the law.”); Elina Lae, Mashups—A Protected Form of Appropriation Art or a Blatant
Copyright Infringement?, 12 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 31, 43 (2012); E. Kenly Ames, Note, Beyond
Rogers v. Koons: A Fair Use Standard for Appropriation, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1473, 1484 (1993).
354. Klinger, 755 F.3d at 497–98.
355. Lavigne, supra note 16, at 325, 359.
356. Stephanie Merry, Inconceivable: ‘My Princess Bride’ Halted After Threat of Lawsuit, THE
WASHINGTON POST: GOING OUT GUIDE (Dec. 6, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/goingout-guide/wp/2013/12/06/inconceivable-my-princess-bride-halted-after-threat-of-lawsuit.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
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[T]he fair use defense is available only after the defendant
begins to defend himself in court, after he, as a possibly
innocent infringer, is pressured to spend money on a
lawyer. This of course makes the fair use exception
virtually untenable to well-intentioned individuals who
happen to not be wealthy.360
As a result, the current state of the law incentivizes copyright
holders to attack all uses of their works, with little downside and
tremendous upside, exploiting both the power imbalance and the
convenient lack of bright line rules.361
Dismissing these issues as the inevitable consequences of
copyright law may have made sense in a world where copyright
looks more like traditional copyright. But in a world where the
copyright holders want copyright to look more like trademark, the
fan community importation of trademark law concepts to check this
expansion seems necessary.
If copyright holders wish to expand their monopoly in a way
similar to trademark, then the limitations that have developed in
trademark law to check trademark monopolies should likewise be
imported.362 Importing such limitations will recalibrate the copyright
balance from its current lopsided state. If copyright’s built-in
limitations have ceased to be effective because of the rise of the
hybrid “copymark” idea,363 then further limitations must be found,
and turning to trademark law makes sense. For instance, the
trademark law practice of disclaimers should be allowed to protect
fan communities’ copyrighted activities364—just as fan communities
360. Richter, supra note 231, at 469; see also Goold, supra note 19, at 893.
361. See Arewa, supra note 16, at 293; Jamar, supra note 128, at 844–45; see also Gardner, supra
note 53; Techdirt, Getty Threatens the Wrong IP Law Firm in Its Copyright Trolling Efforts, ABOVE
THE LAW (Aug. 22, 2014, 10:26 AM), http://abovethelaw.com/2014/08/getty-threatens-the-wrong-iplaw-firm-in-its-copyright-trolling-efforts.
362. Saval, supra note 34, at 423 (noting that trademark law does contain doctrines that operate
similar to copyright law’s fair use doctrines in protecting “unflattering” free speech); Liu, supra note 16,
at 1430, 1439.
363. Litman, supra note 22, at 434, 435 (“The system incorporates limitations because its purpose is
to benefit all of us in a variety of creativity-enhancing ways.”).
364. Liu, supra note 16, at 1433.
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hope that they do, and just as some copyright holders themselves
have encouraged.365 The fan community emphasis on noncommercialism fits nicely into the “non-commercial” exemptions
built into trademark law.366
It makes sense that the fan communities rely on bright line rules
about commercialism and consumer confusion. As discussed, the
result of the resistance to bright line rules in traditional copyright
analyses can actually lead to a discouragement of speech.367 There
are no legal precedents concerning traditional fan activities, which
provides fan communities with even less guidance than other
speakers.368 The fan community introduction of greater predictability
through its reliance on trademark law concepts leads to the
encouragement of more speech, as the fan community experience has
proven.369
This increased clarity also permits fewer latent aesthetic judgments
of the artistic merit of the work in question. Judges in trademark
cases are rarely called upon to determine whether the trademark in
question is a good one that ought to be allowed to exist, as they
regularly are called upon to do in copyright cases with regard to
creative works.370
Fan community norms do not endorse a radical “free commons”
idea where no one has ownership and no one will be able to make
money. Fan communities have a concept of both ownership and
monetization, respect both concepts, and have even begun to engage
in both.

365. Lee, supra note 57, at 1532.
366. Liu, supra note 16, at 1439.
367. Lee, supra note 57, at 1510 (“[T]here is no easy way to draw the line between what is
permissible copying and what is not. This line may be even harder to draw in the noncommercial
context . . . .”); Liu, supra note 16, at 1418; Richter, supra note 231, at 477.
368. See Lee, supra note 57, at 1531.
369. See generally Jamar, supra note 128.
370. See, e.g., Arewa, supra note 16, at 312. Consumer surveys, which dominate trademark cases, do
the work for the judge in trademark cases, permitting the public itself to have a say in where trademark
law protection lies. By contrast, consumer surveys play almost no role in copyright cases. Robert H.
Thornburg, Trademark Surveys: Development of Computer-Based Survey Methods, 4 J. MARSHALL
REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 91, 91 (2004).
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For instance, people who offer downloads of other people’s works
seldom charge for it.371 When fans do monetize their works, they
seem to believe that they have added something of value to the work
that permits them to charge for it—and the people who buy seem to
agree. Maybe it is time to recognize that value explicitly, rather than
devaluing it the way current copyright law does. An
acknowledgement of the creep of trademark into copyright and the
rise of the hybrid “copymark” idea would be the first step to
legitimizing wider, more diverse forms of creativity.
CONCLUSION
Copyright holders, in recognition of the overall trajectory of their
creative industries and how copyrights are being used, have
succumbed to the temptation to import trademark law ideas into the
copyright law context. Courts have also yielded to this temptation,
leading to an overall blurring of the line between copyright and
trademark that looks more similar to “copymark.” Where courts have
tried to clarify copyright and trademark again, they have tended to
only further muddy the waters between them.
Copyright law seeks to balance the rights of the creator against the
rights of the public to engage with the creative work. Trademark law,
however, merely seeks to protect the marketplace. The importation of
trademark ideals into copyright runs the risk of stifling free speech
and strangling the public domain, tipping the copyright balance. The
judicial resistance to bright line rules in the copyright arena has only
resulted in aiding this lopsided balance.
To the extent that we still believe the copyright balance is one we
wish to maintain, the solution need not reinvent the wheel. Rather,
we can look to fan communities for the ways in which they have
sought to check the expanding copyright monopoly and protect the
balance. Fan community practices promote the traditional goals of
copyright, encouraging a flourishing creative community. Their use
371. See, e.g., Jury Orders Student to Pay $675,000 for Illegally Downloading Music, ABC NEWS,
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/story?id=8226751 (last visited Nov. 14, 2015).
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of trademark defenses to do this, in a world where copyright has
begun to look more like trademark, should be supported. After all, if
speech would not be considered harmful in a trademark law context,
surely it should not be stifled in a copyright law context. The
promotion of creative progress at least requires that. In this way, the
Internet can save copyright.
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